Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1997

An Investigation of the Motives in Going-Private Transactions: The
Case of Re-LBOs.
Arman Kosedag
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Kosedag, Arman, "An Investigation of the Motives in Going-Private Transactions: The Case of Re-LBOs."
(1997). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 6429.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6429

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be
from any type of computer printer.
The quality ofthis reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy.

Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white

photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE MOTIVES IN GOING-PRIVATE
TRANSACTIONS: THE CASE OF Re-LBOs

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Interdepartmental Programs in Business Administration

by
Arman Kosedag
B.S., Istanbul University, 1986
M.S., Louisiana State University, 1990
May 1997

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 9736024

UMI Microform 9736024
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Throughout the completion of this dissertation, I have, one
way or another, benefited from the contributions of many
people in various forms.

This fact, however, does not free me

from assuming the responsibility of any error that may still
be present.

The members of my dissertation committee, Profs.

G. Geoffrey Booth, Faik Koray, and William R. Lane, must be
distinguished by their direct contributions to this project in
the form of invaluable comments and suggestions.

Also among

direct contributors are Ms. Yvonne L . Day who did an excellent
editing job in putting together such a gigantic text, and Mr.
David Kwateng and Prof.

Chris J. Muscarella who kindly

assisted in constructing the data set.
I have a particular debt of gratitude to Prof. George M.
Frankfurter, the chairman of the committee, not only for his
generosity in sharing his knowledge and experience that re
shaped my area of interest in Finance but also for his
encouragement, patience, and faith during the completion of
this task.

As

contributions

such,

to my

he remains the only person whose
accomplishment

are both

direct and

indirect.
A wonderful circle of family and friends share the
indirect, but unquestionably the most important, contributions
made to this dissertation.
my

brother

and

his

I would like to thank my sister,

spouse,

and

my

parents

for

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

their

persistence in supporting me with love, understanding, and
sacrifices, and my wife for always standing by me.

Finally,

I would like to dedicate this work to the memory of my
grandfather, Ni§an Koseda£j, who not only taught me to love but
also taught me many lessons of life that cannot be learned in
the most prestigious universities of the world, and to my
daughter, Nadin Melissa K5seda§, who refreshed the meaning of
love.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE O F CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................

ii

LIST OF TABLES...................................

vii

LIST OF FIGURES...................................

ix

ABSTRACT .........................................

X

CHAPTER
1
1.1

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE.................
Notes to chapter 1 ......................

I
5

LITERATURE REVIEW........................
Characteristics of going-private
transactions........................
Explanations for leveraged buyouts (LBOs). .
Cost savings on shareholder relations. . . .
Tax savings..............................
Wealth transfer from bondholders.........
Management incentives and performance
improvements........................
Free cash flow hypothesis.................
Undervaluation of the firm's s t o c k .......
Management manipulation hypothesis .......
Reverse leveraged buyouts................
Characteristics and performance
of reverse L B O s ....................
Decision to return to public markets . . . .
Conclusion.............................
Notes to chapter 2 ......................

7

2
2.1
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6
2.2.7
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.4
2.5
3
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.4
3.4.1
3.4.2

AN APPLICATION OF THE FREE CASH FLOW
HYPOTHESIS TO Re-LBOs....................
Introduction............................
Free cash flows and LBOs (HI).............
The Lehn and Poulsen study...............
Discussion of method of analysis
and proxy variables.................
Logit analysis..........................
Bootstrap algorithm for statistical
significance tests...................
Ordinary least-squares regression.........
Empirical findings......................
Re-LBO sample characteristics.............
The announcement effect of second LBO
transactions: an event study.........

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7
9
9
10
12
13
16
19
20
22
22
25
26
27

29
29
31
31
33
33
37
38
39
39
42

3.4.3

3.4.4
3.4.5
3.4.6
3.5
3.6
3.7
4
4.1
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.3
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.4
4.5
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.3.4
5.3.5
5.3.6
5.3.7
5.4
5.4.1
5.4.2
5.4.3
5.4.4

Comparison of the effect of re-LBO
announcements with the effect of LBO
announcements documented in previous
studies...........................
A preliminary comparison of re-LBO and
control samples ....................
Determinants of the likelihood of going
private: logit analysis .............
Determinants of the premiums paid
in going-private transactions:
ordinary least-sguares analysis. . . .
A comparison of results obtained
from the re-LBO sample with
Lehn and Poulsen's results...........
Chapter summary and conclusion ..........
Notes to chapter 3 ......................
MANAGEMENT'S PERCEPTION OF BUYOUTS:
A SURVEY...............................
Introduction...........................
The undervaluation hypothesis (H2).......
Questionnaire design....................
Construction of the survey sample........
Results and discussion..................
Factor analysis and clustering ..........
LBO group versus reverse LBO group.......
Buyout decisions in value versus
glamour stocks......................
Chapter summary and conclusion ..........
Notes to chapter 4 .....................
UNDERVALUATION AS AN INCENTIVE FOR LBOs:
HYPOTHESES TESTS USING MARKET DATA
Introduction
Reverse LBO sample characteristics
The profit motive in the reverse LBO(H3). .
Implications of H 3 ......................
A discussion of the proxy variable.......
The control sample..............
Empirical test of H 3 ....................
An extension of H3: Industry hypothesis. . .
Empirical test of industry hypothesis. . . .
Results and discussion..................
Application of learning curve concept
to L B O s ...........................
The learning curve hypothesis (H4).......
Empirical findings and discussion ofH4. . .
The sharing of wealth between pre- and
post-buyout shareholders (H5) .......
Empirical findings and discussion ofH5. . .
v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
48
51
53
57
59
61

63
63
66
66
72
74
83
93
97
100
102

105
105
106
109
110
Ill
113
115
116
117
119
120
121
121
123
124

5.4.5
5.4.6
5.5
5.6

Premiums paid to pre-buyout
shareholders in the first and
the second buyouts (H6).............
Empirical findings and discussion of H6. . .
Chapter summary and conclusion...........
Notes to chapter 5 ......................

125
126
127
129

6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ..................

130

REFERENCES.......................................

133

APPENDIX.........................................

139

V I T A ............................................

141

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF TABLES
3.1

Descriptive statistics for the re-LBO sample. . .

41

3.2

Daily average prediction errors (APE)
from 20 days before to 20 days after
the announcement of 21 re-LBOs................

44

3.3

Summary of going-private transaction studies. . .

47

3.4

Mean values of variables for re-LBO
and control firms and corresponding
t-statistics for difference in means
test for matched samples......................

49

Logistic regression analysis of likelihood
of going private..............................

52

OLS regression analysis of premiums paid
in going-private transactions................

55

Management's perception of buyouts:
summary statistics of the survey...............

75

4.2

Results for the extraction of components.......

84

4.3

Unrotated component loadings and communalities. .

86

4.4

Varimax rotated component loadings.............

87

4.5

Analysis of agglomeration coefficients:
Hierarchical clustering ......................

89

4.6

Manova summary table of three clusters.........

92

4.7

Cross tabulation results of 17 statements by
LBO and reverse LBO groups....................

94

Manova summary table of LBO versus
reverse LBO grouping..........................

96

Summary statistics of accounting and marketbased measures for 58 management buyouts........

99

3.5
3.6
4.1

4.8
4.9

4.10 Summary table of low MV/BV versus high MV/BV
groups......................................
5.1
5.2

100

Descriptive statistics for reverse LBO firms,
grouped by LBO y e a r ..........................

107

Descriptive statistics for reverse LBO firms,
grouped by going-public year..................

109

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5.3 Mean reverse LBO buyout value and
mean control firm market value.................

114

5.4 Performance tests for the reverse LBOfirms . . .

116

5.5 Industrial distribution of 104 reverse
LBO firms...................................

118

5.6 Mean values of performance variables:
An industrial comparison......................

120

5.7 Comparison of value gains for re>LBOs
and successful reverse LBO firms...............

123

5.8 Comparison of management's return and
shareholders' return in reverse LBO
transactions.................................

125

5.9 Comparison of [-20/+20] window CAPEs for
first and second LBO announcements.............

127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF FIGURES
3.1

Cumulative average predictionerrors
for the [-20,+20] event window................

45

4.1

Scree curve of eigen values..................

85

5.1

Time table of a reverse L B O ..................

112

ix

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

The commonly understood and traditional forms of termination
for a public firm are the takeover and bankruptcy.

"Going

private" is a new and interesting third alternative.

once

the "going public" option— a significant number of observed
reverse leveraged buyout (LBO) cases— is taken into account,
however,

this

new

alternative and traditional ways becomes apparent.

Even

more

the

fundamental

fascinating than the

difference between

"public-to-private private-to-

public" move is the fact that some companies go private
again.
This dissertation examines the phenomenon of re-LBOs;
that is, the practice of going private via management buyout,
then reobtaining public status through a new initial public
offering,

and

then

going

private

a second time.

The

dissertation encompasses various dimensions that should, in
addition to explaining re-LBOs,

provide new evidence for

existing theories of going-private transactions.
First, the dissertation investigates the applicability of
the leading theoretical and empirical issues of LBOs to a reLBO sample, thus providing a comparative analysis of LBOs and
re-LBOs.

Specifically, it

challenges the free cash

flow

argument of LBOs by replicating the Lehn and Poulsen (1989)
study of going-private transactions with the re-LBO sample.
Second,

the

dissertation

proposes

an

information

asymmetry hypothesis to going-private transactions. This part
x
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of the dissertation reports the results of a survey of the
views of management in 600 LBOs.

The results of the survey

are substantiated by tests of a set of hypotheses that exploit
either reverse LBO or re-LBO samples to provide additional
statistical evidence on the information asymmetry issue.
Although reverse LBOs have been examined in the finance
literature to some degree, the use of re-LBO firms to study
management buyouts is original.

xi
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Chapter 1
I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D P URPOSE

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the phenomenon
of re-LBOs;

that is,

the practice of going private via

management buyout, then reobtaining public status through a
new initial public offering, and then going private a second
time.

It is posited that the initial buyout occurs because of

management's belief that the firm is undervalued. This belief
is tantamount to saying that the firm is worth more than its
market value.

Incumbent management thus implements a buyout,

believing that it can increase the market value of the firm
and profit in the process.

If this argument holds, then

management will bring the firm public again in order to
exploit

the

benefits

of

removing

the firm

from public

scrutiny. Moreover, as intuition suggests, if the objective is
successfully achieved, the whole process will be repeated.
"Going private" through management buyout (MBO) and its
consequences have been the subject of frequent debates among
policy makers and financial economists during the last 15
years.1

By no means does this era constitute the entire

period of these highly levered transactions, however.

In

fact, leveraged buyouts (LBOs), known as "bootstrapping," date
to the early 1960s.

In its earlier versions, an LBO was a

practice by which the owner/founder, seeking to cash out his
investment, transferred the firm to managers or younger family
members, who would put up a small amount of capital and borrow
1
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the rest.

Today, LBOs differ from their earlier appearance in

that they have been applied to those companies that are not
only large, but also publicly traded.2
The going-private transaction encompasses a number of
inextricably

connected

theoretical

issues:

the

capital

structure of a firm (which translates into tax savings,
signaling, and wealth transfers among parties), agency theory,
dividend policy, and ownership structure.

MBOs thus provide

a single case that incorporates various unresolved issues in
corporate finance. This fact makes MBOs even more interesting
to study than any one component alone.
Research on the subject has generated several hypotheses
that seek both to justify buyout activities and to explain the
source of significant premiums paid to shareholders. Although
they fail to provide a single precise source of gain for the
value

creation

of

LBOs,

findings

tend

to

support

the

elimination of public reporting expenses and agency costs,
alignment of managerial interests with company objectives,
monitoring by sponsors/buyout specialists, and tax effects.
This agreement among studies mitigated the public criticism of
the LBO phenomenon until the appearance of reverse LBOs (i.e.,
LBO firms that subsequently return to capital markets).

The

enormous returns earned by some buyout investors served to
heighten

the

transactions.

public

skepticism

associated

with

buyout

If indeed the sources of the gains were those

mentioned above, why would LBO firms become public companies
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again?

Even more fascinating than the previous question is

why some of these reverse LBOs would go private a second time
(i.e., become re-LBOs).
This dissertation seeks to provide an answer to these
questions. Accomplishing this objective extends the empirical
work on buyout transactions in two ways.
First,

this

dissertation

uses

a

re-LBO

sample

to

replicate the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) study of free cash flow
and stockholders' gains in going-private transactions.

Lehn

and Poulsen find a significant relation between undistributed
cash flow and a firm's decision to go private.
this

conclusion,

stockholder

they

gains

in

report

that

going-private

a

Parallel with

major

source

transactions

is

of
the

mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash flow,
an hypothesis introduced by Jensen (1986). Lehn and Poulsen's
study

is

certainly

not

the

only one

analyzing

certain

characteristics of going-private firms; however, it appears to
be the eminent work on the direct test of the free cash flow
hypothesis,

which

has

already

been

scrutinized.3

Inconsistencies in the Jensen's free cash flow theory and
conflicting results from its empirical investigation suggest
that additional research is needed on the subject.

This

dissertation, hence, examines the relevance of the free cash
flow hypothesis to MBOs by using the re-LBO sample.

As such,

this section of the dissertation can be also viewed as a
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search for the explicit similarities or differences between
LBOs and re-LBOs.
Second,

this

dissertation

explores

the

information asymmetry as a rationale for buyouts.
especially

in

the

settings

of

a Modigliani

role

of

In theory,
and Miller

(henceforth, MM) world, an LBO is merely a change in the
organizational and capital structure of a firm and should
provide no additional gains to the parties.

Observation of a

significant number of LBOs suggests, however, that corporate
managers view corporate restructuring activities differently
than has been suggested by theory and may have other reasons
for initiating these activities.
Proposing the asymmetric information for LBO transactions
is not new.

In fact, both Smith (1990) and Ofek (1994) cast

doubt on the information asymmetry hypothesis in that their
findings

associate performance

buyout proposals only.
empirically

improvements

to completed

Although existing evidence cannot

substantiate

the

asymmetric

information

hypothesis, conclusions are based on a limited study only and
lack evidence that can come only from a more meaningful
sample.
This dissertation takes a different path.

It uses a

survey of the views of management in 600 LBO cases

to

determine the main motivation for the buyout, and draws on a
sample of firms that experienced an LBO twice (in other words,
were re-LBOs) to test related hypotheses.

This original
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sample may contribute much to the continuing debate about
various explanations of going-private transactions.

In the

present setting, the re-LBO sample, together with the use of
a reverse LBO sample,

is expected to provide additional

insights into the asymmetric information explanation for MBOs
through tests of several hypotheses.
Chapter 2 contains a more detailed discussion and review
of the prior work on both LBOs and reverse LBOs.

Chapter 3

replicates Lehn and Poulsen's (1989) study, using a re-LBO
sample to show the irrelevance of free cash flow hypothesis as
a general explanation for going-private transactions. Chapter
4 presents the results of a survey of management's perception
of buyouts.

Chapter 5 studies remaining hypotheses that are

intended to provide additional insights into the asymmetric
information

explanation

of

MBOs

by

using

market

data.

Summary, conclusions, and avenues for future research are
discussed in chapter 6.
1.1

Notes to Chapter 1

1.

In the following, the terms management buyout (MBO) and
leveraged buyout (LBO) are used interchangeably to define
a buyout transaction implemented by the management team
of the company.

2.

The RJR-Nabisco buyout, with a bid of $24.9 billion, is
known as the biggest going-private deal.
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3.

The free cash flow hypothesis in general (see Reiter,
1994) and its application to rationalize LBO transactions
in particular (see Frankfurter and McGoun, 1996) have
been questioned in the recent literature.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This review of literature relating to MBOs is divided into
three parts.

The first two parts include a brief discussion

of the characteristics of going-private transactions (2.1) and
presents various explanations and evidence associated with
these transactions (2.2).

The third part (2.3) gives an

overview of previous studies on reverse LBOs (return to public
ownership).
2.1

Characteristics of Going-Private Transactions

Despite the lack of an applicable theory to explain the
phenomenon of MBOs, there exists a number of hypotheses
justifying
rationales.

buyout

activities

on

the

basis

of

economic

These hypotheses are neither conclusive nor

mutually exclusive. Before discussing each hypothesis and its
relevant empirical findings in detail, it is helpful to review
the main characteristics of MBO transactions.
Going-private deals differ from other corporate control
transactions primarily in that they do not combine two
previously separate entities into a single public economic
unit, but, instead, create a privately held company with a
limited number of investors. Since incumbent management often
appears as the bidder and since such transactions are usually
financed largely with debt, these activities are called MBOs,
LBOs,

or

(more descriptive,

but

used

less

frequently)

leveraged management buyouts (LMBOs). There is a tendency for
7
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management's equity ownership to increase as a result of the
MBO.

To secure the loans, management pledges the assets and

future cash flows of the subject company as collateral.
Another characteristic of MBOs is the participation of
large-block equity investors, who in most cases are buyout
specialists.

These

large-block

investors

are

usually

appointed to the board of directors and maintain an active
role in monitoring management's activity and performance.

A

third characteristic of these transactions is the absence of
registration and other public ownership expenses, owing to the
new organizational form.

A fourth characteristic of MBOs is

the considerable reduction in the liquidity of a firm's claims
(especially equity claims) because of lost or limited access
to public equity markets after the buyout.
Studies by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), Marais,
Schipper, and Smith (1989), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), and
Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) report a 30% to 40% premium paid to the
shareholders over the pre-buyout market price.
such gains,

In view of

it is not surprising that MBOs raise several

issues that are worth studying, particularly with regard to
the effect of MBOs on the efficiency and market value of
firms.

In fact, the issue of excess gains accruing to pre

buyout stockholders has,

in itself,

been the subject of

several studies. For example, Torabzadeh and Bertin (1987) do
not

test

positive

any

specific

abnormal

hypothesis,

returns

but

of 23.26%

show significant

realized

by

target
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shareholders

as

a

result

of

the

buyout

announcement.

Torabzadeh and Bertin view this result as justification of the
economic rationality of MBOs, when in fact it could simply be
a means of wealth transfer.
2.2 Explanations for Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)
This

section

presents

seven

possible

explanations

or

hypotheses for LBOs. These include cost savings, tax savings,
wealth transfer,

management

incentives,

free cash

flow,

undervaluation of stock, and management manipulation.
2.2.1 Cost Savings on Shareholder Relations
An immediate gain that going-private can generate is the
saving of registration, listing, and other public ownership
expenses,

such as disclosure requirements, which

can be

especially significant for smaller firms. DeAngelo, DeAngelo,
and Rice (1984) are first in proposing and examining this
potential source of value.

In their hypothetical setting, an

annual potential saving of $100,000 from such items translates
into a present value of $1,000,000 at a 10% discount rate.
The importance of this example is strengthened by the findings
of Maupin (1987), who estimates the direct costs (excluding
management time and indirect costs such as additional audit
fees)

of public ownership to range between $60,000

and

$250,000 per year. By itself, however, this explanation is
sufficient only for the smallest scale MBOs.
At least two drawbacks of this explanation are in order:
(1) cost savings on shareholder relations cannot rationalize

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the

reverse LBO phenomena

observed by Cummings

(1989),

Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989, 1990), and Ainina and Mohan
(1991); and, (2) this rationale ignores the fact that LBOs
with outstanding debt continue to incur some public relations
costs since they must still file 10Q and 10K reports with the
SEC.

In fact, even in the absence of public debt, buyout

firms

may

seek

some

costly

means

to

disseminate

the

information about their financial performance to the market.
They do this because greater uncertainty about
results

in

a

lower

price

when

they

go

the firm

public

again.

Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) argue, for example, that the
public knows more about firms re-entering the capital markets
(reverse LBOs) than firms entering the market for the first
time. In support of their argument, they report statistically
significant less underpricing for the reverse LBO firms at
their "second" initial public offering than for those firms
that go public for the first time.

It seems necessary,

therefore, to keep the market informed so that the LBO can
command a higher price when it goes public again.
2.2.2 Tax Savings
The most frequently cited benefit of going-private is the tax
saving.

In fact, both Lowenstein (1985) and Frankfurter and

Gunay (1993) argue that the use of debt in buyout deals is
attributable to tax subsidy only.
shield of higher interest costs,

In addition to the tax
buyout reduces

the tax
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liability

through

the

increased

depreciation

deduction

associated with the write-up of assets following the buyout.
The evidence presented by Lehn and Poulsen
Marais,

Schipper

and

Smith

(1989),

Kaplan

(1988),

(1989a),

and

Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) supports the tax advantages
of LBOs.

For example, using a sample of 76 management-led

going-private transactions undertaken in the period 1980 to
1986, Kaplan (1989a) estimates a median value of tax-driven
benefits (both from interest and depreciation deductions) that
is between 21% and 142.6% of the premium paid to shareholders.
Similarly, Schipper and Smith (1988) find a strong correlation
between tax benefits and the premium paid.

Kaplan (1989a)

also reports that the excess return to pre-buyout shareholders
is significantly related to potential tax benefits generated
by the buyout.

He does not find any significant relation

between the excess return to post-buyout shareholders and
potential tax benefits of the buyout, however.
All the above studies agree, nevertheless, that the total
value created in an LBO cannot be explained by tax advantages
only. This point is confirmed by one of the advocates of debt
(due to the interest tax shield it creates) in a firm's
capital structure.

Miller (1991) states, " . . . tax savings

alone cannot plausibly account for the observed LBO premiums."
In this vein, Frankfurter and Gunay (1993) take the previous
literature one step further and, in a partial-equilibrium,
asymmetric-information setting, show that the major forces
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behind the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders are the
anticipated tax subsidy and management's desire to divest.
2.2.3 Wealth Transfer from Bondholders

Leverage is not without its cost.

Large increments of

additional debt can increase the potential for bankruptcy and
hence raise the cost of debt financing.

Moreover, in an

option-pricing framework, any risk-increasing activity of the
firm will enhance the position of the stockholders at the
expense of bondholders.

Lehn and Poulsen (1988), Marais,

Schipper, and Smith (1989), Asquith and Wizman (1990), and
Cook,

Easterwood,

transfers

and Martin

from the

(1992)

bondholders

of

consider the wealth
the

target

firm

to

stockholders (due to the substantial increase in debt-equity
ratio)

as

a

possible

portion

of

premiums

paid

to

shareholders.1
Lehn and Poulsen (1988) report an average price decline
of 1.42% based on 13 bonds (of various LBO firms) traded on
the exchange during the 20-day period centered on the LBO
announcement date.

This decline is considerably smaller than

the 7.21% average drop in the 20-bond index (reported daily in
The Wall Street Journal)

for the same period.

Marais,

Schipper, and Smith (1989) also find minimal effects of goingprivate transactions on debt claims.

In fact, the negative

average abnormal return for a period from the buyout announce
ment to the completion of transaction is both statistically
insignificant

and limited

to nonconvertible bondholders.
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Asquith and Wizman (1990) report a loss of 6.8% of the
gain accruing to the equity holders experienced by bondholders
with no protective covenants accounts only.
this

result,

(depending

Cook,

on

Easterwood,

restrictive

and

Consistent with

Martin

covenants)

the

(1992)
presence

find
of

significant bondholder losses that, on average, are 3% of the
market value of bonds.
these studies

Overall, the evidence provided by

is inconclusive,

and the magnitude of the

bondholders' losses is insufficient to explain shareholders'
gains.

This result, not surprisingly,

necessitates

(and

generates) the consideration of other factors as the sources
of gains.
2.2.4 Management Incentives and Performance Improvements

Change in ownership structure brought about by an MBO provides
a good fit to the agency theory.

Specifically, within the

agency theory, management no longer shares the costs of its
shirking and

its consuming perquisites

that may provide

incentives to improve the firm's operating and management
performance.
management,
presumably

With

a

substantially

managerial
aligned

more

and

increased

stockholder

closely.2

stake

interests

Moreover, a

by
are

closer

monitoring of managers' actions is conducted by other major
investors,

compared

with

that

of

a

diffused

ownership

structure.

These explanations are in keeping with the view

prevalent in recent literature that there is a tendency to get
away from finance and provide more micro-economic-oriented
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explanations for going-private transactions.3

Researchers

following this line of logic also have a positive view of LBOs
and document

substantial

efficiency

gains

stemming

from

organizational changes and asset control.
Kaplan (1989b), Smith (1990), Muscarella and Vetsuypens
(1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Opler (1992), and Ofek
(1994) provide comparable results characterized, after LBOs,
by increases in industry-adjusted operating profit/sales,
operating

profits

per

flow/operating assets.

employee,

and

operating

cash

Kaplan (1989b) analyzes the post

buyout operating performance of 48 MBOs completed between 1980
and 1986.

His results indicate that 76% of the sample firms

experienced an average increase in operating income of 40%
within two years of going private.

Over a three-year post

buyout period, average operating income was 42% higher than
that for the year preceding the buyout.

Moreover, operating

income measured net of industry changes remained essentially
unchanged in the first two post-buyout years and became 24%
higher in the third year. Kaplan's conclusion that efficiency
gains constitute a major source of pre-buyout shareholders'
gains is driven by the high correlation found between the
premiums paid to pre-buyout

shareholders and post-buyout

performance improvements.
Smith's (1990) examination of 58 MBOs, completed during
the period 1977 to 1986, provides results consistent with
Kaplan's (1989b); that is, operating cash flow per employee
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and the operating cash flow per dollar book value of assets
increase relative to the year preceding the buyout.

Like

Kaplan, Smith finds that cash flow improves under private
ownership. Smith attributes this finding to better management
of working capital, which is reflected as a reduction in the
inventory-holding period and in the

accounts-receivable-

collection period.
Unlike Kaplan

(1989b) and Smith

(1990), who analyze

company-level data, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) examine
total factor productivity (output per unit of total input) of
approximately 1,000 plants involved in LBOs during the period
1981 to 1986. They find an improvement in plant productivity,
which moves from 2.0% above the industry mean in the three
pre-buyout years to 8.3% above the mean in the three post
buyout years.
At the case study level, Baker and Wruck (1989) credit
organizational changes, characterized by heavy debt load and
management equity ownership,

for the

improved operating

performance of the company, O.M. Scott & Sons.

They view a

stronger incentive compensation plan, a reorganization and
decentralization

of

decision

making,

sponsors as equally important.

and monitoring

by

The role of these factors

becomes more apparent in Denis' (1994) comparison of Kroger's
recapitalization

and

transactions resulted

Safeway's

LBO.

in debt levels

Although
of more than

both
90%,

Kroger's managers were not as successful as Safeway's in
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improving profits and cash flows.

Denis attributes this

result to Kroger's lack of increased managerial shareholding,
sponsor's ownership and monitoring, and the close linking of
managerial compensation to company performance.
2.2.5 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis

Jensen (1986, 1988) extends the agency-theory-based management
incentive and compensation hypothesis of LBOs by assigning
debt a special role in these transactions.

His argument

differs from the conventional view of debt as a tax advantage.
According to Jensen, many of the benefits in going-private
transactions stem from debt's "control function" on managers
with respect to free cash flow.

Free cash flow is defined as

cash flow in excess of that required to fund all positive net
present value (NPV) projects of a firm.
The

payout

of

free

cash

flow

to

shareholders

consistent with the value maximization principle.

is

Strangely,

however, debt is thought to be the sole candidate to fit the
role in distributing the free cash flow through periodic
interest payments. A permanent increase in dividends does not
achieve a similar result because such a promise is considered
weak since dividends can be cut in the future (i.e., there is
no contractual obligation to make promised dividend payments).
Management, therefore, selects the debt option instead so that
if they default they can lose everything, both their ownership
in the firm as well as their jobs.

This story cannot be

accepted without admitting that managers are acting in the
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best interest of the shareholders, contradicting the "me-first
rule" of agency theory.
There are, however, several other behaviors consistent
with "me-first rule" management.

One of these is retaining

the free cash flow to fund new (but not positive NPV) projects
without a need for external financing.

This action protects

managers from the scrutiny of the capital markets.

There is

also evidence that increases in executive pay are strongly
related

to

increases

in

sales

growth

(Murphy,

1985),

suggesting that management wants to have control of the free
cash flow to increase corporate size even at the expense of
suboptimal acquisitions.4
Logical inconsistencies in the theoretical arguments
surrounding

free

cash

flow

hypothesis

are

mirrored

empirical studies that produce conflicting results.

in
The

following discussion covers only those studies of goingprivate transactions that provide evidence about pre-buyout
characteristics of LBOs.
An implication of the free cash flow argument for goingprivate transactions is that, in order to be an LBO candidate,
a firm must have substantial free cash flow at the discretion
of management. Accordingly, firms or divisions of large firms
that have stable business histories and low growth prospects
are more likely to be subject to LBOs.

Empirical studies make

observations consistent with these predictions.

Most LBOs

take place in mature industries (Lehn and Poulsen, 1988; and
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Kieschnik,

1989),

and

the

growth

rates

and

capital

expenditures of LBO firms are lower than those of comparable
firms in the same industry

(Kaplan, 1989a;

and Lehn and

Poulsen, 1988, 1989).
The study by Maupin, Bidwell, and Ortegren (1984) is
probably the

first to explicitly analyze the pre-buyout

characteristics of LBOs.

They use discriminant analysis to

compare 63 LBO firms during the period 1972 to 1983 with a
control sample matched by size and industry classification.
Although their study is descriptive and is not intended to
test any hypotheses about the motivation of LBOs, it produces
findings contradictory to the free cash flow hypothesis. They
report a significantly higher dividend yield variable for the
LBO firms.

This finding, even in the presence of higher cash

flow variables for the buyout firms, is inconsistent with the
free cash flow hypothesis since ". . . it [i.e., positive and
significant dividend yield variable] indicates that whatever
free cash flows are generated by the firm are distributed to
stockholders” (Kieschnik, 1989).
Lehn and Poulsen
Jensen's theory,

(1988)

show that,

consistent with

their proxy for free cash flow and the

premium paid in LBOs are positively related.

Consistent with

their previous finding, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) use a logistic
regression

equation and obtain

a

significantly

positive

relationship between undistributed cash flow and a firm's
decision to go private.
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Kieschnik's results

(1989),

on the other hand,

are

unsupportive of the free cash flow argument, although he uses
the same method of analysis. He finds that the free cash flow
variable is statistically insignificant and that it has a
negative sign.
(1993)

In a more recent study, Opler and Titman

conclude

that the main

characteristics

of

firms

initiating LBOs are unfavorable investment opportunities (low
Tobin's q) and high cash flows.
free cash

Inconsistencies in Jensen's

flow theory and conflicting results

from its

empirical investigation suggest that additional research is
needed on the subject.
2.2.6 Undervaluation of the Firm's Stock

There is an apparent conflict of interest in a management
buyout,

since

the managers making the

purchase have an

information advantage over both current stockholders and other
potential purchasers.

It is plausible, therefore, to posit

information asymmetry as an explanation for going-private
transactions.

The rationale behind this assertion is that

going-private transactions are, in a sense, an extreme form of
corporate stock repurchase by a management team that possesses
private and valuable information about the future prospects of
the firm's cash flows.

This contention is in line with Myers

and Majluf's (1984) suggestion that common stock issuance
(purchase) will be chosen by management if it believes the
stock price is too high (low).5
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Both Smith (1990) and Ofek (1994) cast doubt on the
information asymmetry hypothesis.

Their findings attribute

performance improvements to completed buyout proposals only.
Specifically, Smith (1990) reports no increase in cash flows
following a failed buyout proposal, and she reports a similar
performance for completed management-proposed buyouts and for
buyouts initiated by a takeover threat or by outsiders.
(1994)

reinforces Smith's

Ofek

findings and reports that,

at

cancellation announcements (of MBO proposals), returns drop to
2% (from 27% measured for the period extending from one month
before the buyout announcement to the day after the MBO offer
announcement), which is insignificantly different from zero,
and

persist

there

for

the

following

two

years.

Ofek

attributes poor performance of uncompleted MBO offers to the
absence of organizational changes in the completed buyouts
rather than to information asymmetry.

That is, if a buyout is

motivated by undervaluation, then abnormal returns should
remain positive regardless of the outcome of the buyout offer.
The

very

fact that Ofek's

study

finds

no evidence

of

improvements in operating performance in unwillingly canceled
offers rules out the possibility that the cancellation results
from bad information, and, hence, strengthens the doubts about
the information advantage hypothesis.
2.2.7 Management Manipulation Hypothesis
It is also often indicated in the literature that managers may
even distort the operating data through manipulations of
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accounting information to reduce the acquisition price.6
Evidence supporting the manipulation hypothesis is limited.
Kaplan

(1989b),

although

management's manipulation.

indirectly,
He reports

casts
that

doubts

on

post-buyout

operating performance in the first two years after the buyout
is below the projections provided to prospective lenders by
managers in the buyout proxy statements.

This finding is

contrary to the view that buyout company managers purposely
mislead public shareholders by understating the projections.
DeAngelo

(1986)

explicitly considers

the management

manipulation issue and also fails to support it.

She studies

the accounting decisions made by managers of 64 firms that
proposed to go private during the period 1973 to 1982.

Her

findings give no indication that managers of sample firms
systematically understate earnings in periods before an MBO
proposal.

As a possible explanation, DeAngelo suggests that

outside scrutiny by public shareholders and their financial
advisers deters management manipulation.
Wu (1992), on the other hand, argues that DeAngelo's
results may also be due to the fact that she ignores the
macroeconomic factors, or that management manipulates other
information in addition to earnings that depress stock prices
prior to the MBO announcement.

For a sample of 107 MBO firms,

he finds that managers manipulated earnings to depress stock
prices before the announcement. This practice enabled them to
pay a lower premium to pre-buyout shareholders.

He also
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documents

that

smaller

institutional

shareholdings

are

associated with greater earnings decreases, and hence with
smaller premiums.

U.S. companies are not the only ones

subject to the management manipulation hypothesis. Wright and
Coyne (1985) use data from the United Kingdom and find support
for the management manipulation hypothesis.
2.3 Reverse Leveraged Buyouts

Although a precise source of gain has not been found for the
value

creation

of

LBOs,

findings

tend

to

support

the

elimination of public reporting expenses and agency costs,
alignment of managerial interests with company objectives, and
tax gains.

This agreement among studies mitigated the public

criticism of the LBO phenomenon until the appearance of the
reverse LBOs. The enormously large returns earned by some
buyout

investors

served

to

heighten

public

skepticism

associated with buyout transactions.7 If indeed the sources
of the gains were those mentioned above, why would LBO firms
become public companies again?
2.3.1 Characteristics and Performance of Reverse LBOs

Reverse LBOs have received some measure of attention in the
recent literature.
(1989)

use

a

For example, Muscarella and Vetsuypens

sample

of

74

such

firms

to

examine

the

underpricing phenomenon of initial public offerings (IPOs).
Their study supports the information asymmetry explanation of
underpricing in IPOs because average initial returns for firms
re-entering the public markets (which presumably are better
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known by the public) are lower than those of IPOs.*

The

importance of their study for this research, however, is that
they report an average life of only 34.2 months (median = 29
months) for private ownership.

As Muscarella and Vetsuypens

(1989) state,
The relatively short period during which several of the sample
firms remained in private hands is noteworthy, given the
substantial transactions costs associated with such a publicprivate-public ownership structure.
One firm returned to
public capital markets only four months after its LBO, and
nine firms reconverted to public ownership less than one year
after completing their going private transaction.

In a follow-up study on the same sample, Muscarella and
vetsuypens (1990) examine the performance of these companies
during the period the firm was privately held.

For the full

sample, they report a 268.4% median annualized rate of return
on equity, based on comparisons of the going-private price and
going-public price.

Overall, their study tends to credit the

incentive effects of high leverage and concentrated ownership,
but fails to provide any evidence that can refute the claim
that buyout investors exploit inside information.
words,

In their

"It is also possible that the efficiency gains we

document would have occurred anyway, and that managers timed
the buyout to exploit favorable inside information" (ibid., p.
1404).
A notable finding of Muscarella and Vetsuypen's (1990)
study is that leverage declines under private ownership.

For

their sample of reverse LBOs, the median leverage value
decreased from 93.4% prevalent after the buyout to 78.6% prior
to the IPO.

Coupled with the fact that only a few companies
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in the sample intend to use the IPO proceeds for capital
expenditures, their finding suggests that going public lowers
a company's leverage rather than expands its asset base.
Indeed, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) report a median postIPO leverage of 55.5%.9
Mohan (1990) also provides a similar conclusion with
respect to reduction in leverage while the firm was private.
She interprets the significantly higher capital expenditures
of the second initial public offering (SIPO) firms in the
first fiscal year as correcting for the postponement of
capital

expenditures

(perhaps

due

to

debt

service

requirements) during the private period.
With
following

respect
a

Vetsuypens

firm's
(1990)

to

the
going

report

changes
public
that

the

in

insider

again,

ownership

Muscarella

median

ownership

and
of

executive officers and directors in reverse LBOs drops from
63.4% prior to the IPO to 44.5% after the IPO.

Similarly,

DeAngelo and Zeckhauser (1993) find that, on average, insiders
sell 10% of their holdings in the IPO associated with the
reverse LBO.

Note that, although findings on both leverage

and management ownership in the going-private/going-public
cycle are consistent with a possible information advantage of
insiders, they are in stark contrast with agency costs and
free cash flow explanations of the LBO transactions.

That is,

as pointed out by Van de Gucht (1994), Jensen's (1986, 1988)
argument would be supported only under the conditions that
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"reverse LBOs continue to exhibit the typical post-buyout
characteristics,

such as high debt and insider ownership

levels."
Using 85 firms in their sample, Mian and Rosenfeld (1993)
report 31% cumulative abnormal returns in 25 months after LBO
firms went public.

Further examination of the sample reveals

that the long-term positive abnormal performance following the
reverse LBOs is mainly due to takeover premiums.

They

conclude that going public provides initial liquidity and a
showcase (to buyout specialists) that facilitates a subsequent
sale to an outside party.
2.3.2 Decision to Return to Public Markets

The study by DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) differs from the
previous ones by explicitly focusing on the decision to return
to public ownership (re-entry decision).

In an asymmetric

information framework, they provide a model that predicts
superior performance before the IPO.
Information asymmetry, in their setting, translates into
management's manipulation of performance, their extraordinary
effort before the IPO, or performance borrowing from the
future

(i.e.,

discounting prices to boost the

sales or

deferring R&D expenses). Superior performance before the IPO
is also consistent with pure selection, which refers to the
tendency of firms to go to market when their performance is
extraordinarily good relative to other firms and to previous
years.

Although both of these hypotheses predict distinct
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performance in the period before the offer, they differ in
their predictions of performance in the following periods.
The pure selection hypothesis suggests an average performance
in the next period, but the information asymmetry hypothesis
predicts a sharp deterioration in performance, compared with
that of other firms.
By using a sample of 62 reverse LBOs, the study finds
that reverse LBOs display superior performance in the pre
offering year (compared with other firms and continuing LBOs)
and

a

disappointing

(compared

with

performance

their

own

in

the

following

year

previous year

and with

the

performance of control firms). This result is consistent with
the authors' information asymmetry hypothesis.
2.4

Conclusion

To date, the findings cluster around the following factors
proposed

to

explain

the

premiums

paid

to

pre-buyout

shareholders in going-private transactions: cost savings on
shareholder

relations,

tax

benefit

of

debt

financing,

alignment of managerial interests with company objectives, and
reduction in agency costs.

The evidence shows that going

private leads to operating efficiency gains and increased cash
flows that are commonly attributed to the reduction of agency
costs. High insider ownership, monitoring by LBO specialists,
and the control

function of debt on free

believed

combined in a

to

Accordingly,

be

buyout

cash flow

transaction

are

only.

any other form of reorganization (such as a
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leveraged recapitalization) or any other direct form of cash
distribution (such as increased dividend payments) are not
viewed capable of producing similar results.
ruled

out,

however,

is

that

the

What cannot be

reported

accounting

performance improvements might also have occurred even without
these

firms

going private and may

in

fact reflect

the

information advantage of management.
Moreover, as the studies on reverse LBOs suggest, the
improved performance under private ownership appears to be
temporary.

This observation, combined with the fact that

insider ownership and leverage declines after coming back to
the public, suggests that managers may be exploiting their
information privileges.
Finally,

one of the popular explanations of LBOs—

Jensen's free cash flow theory— is found to have logical
inconsistencies,

which

are reflected

in the conflicting

results produced by empirical investigation.

All these

observations suggest that additional research is needed on
going-private transactions.
2.5 Notes to Chapter 2
1.

Surrounding the first announcement of RJR Nabisco's LBO,
RJR Nabisco's common stock price increased 61.8%, while
the price of one of its outstanding bonds declined 16.5%
(Wallace, 1988).

2.

Kaplan (1989) estimates a median post-buyout equity
ownership by management as 22.6%.
According to
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), it is 63.4%— far higher
than in public companies.

3.

Specifically, Miller (1991) states, "The source of the
major gains in value achieved in the LBO's of the 1980's
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lies, in fact, not in our newly-recognized field of
finance at all, but in that older, and long-established
field of economics, industrial organization.
Perhaps
industrial reorganization might be an apter term."
4.

See Mueller (1969) and Roll's (1986) "hubris hypothesis."

5.

The use of "debt" can also be justified by referring to
asymmetric information between the management team and
shareholders in buyout transactions. In the context of
Leland and Pyle's (1977) model, manager-owners are likely
to have a large equity participation and, naturally,
additional firm-specific risk when information is
favorable. Combined with the aforementioned statement,
the signaling model of Ross (1977) and the pecking order
theory of Myers (1984) will predict debt as the form of
outside financing. Interestingly, this contention cam be
extended such that Campbell's (1979) value of information
confidentiality argument can also be brought into the
scenario. In Campbell's paper, management— unwilling to
share valuable information with the new stockholders—
discloses the information to a bank or uses privately
placed debt so that only the current shareholders can
reap the value gain.

6.

"The CEO (of Regina) , who held about 50% of the stock
during the buyout, sold one-tenth of his stake for $2.1
million.
Regina exhibited very strong stock price
performance in the first two years following its IPO. In
1988, the CEO abruptly resigned and confessed to having
manipulated the firm's reported results" (DeGeorge and
Zeckhauser, 1993).

7.

For example, according to Mohan (1990), the management of
Calton Inc. converted an initial investment of $4,595,000
into $71,443,000 in a 1.5-year period only. Similarly,
Ainina and Mohan (1991) report a 521% increase in the
market value of Leslie Fay between the LBO and SIPO date
and state that "many critics consider this activity a
revolving door policy, a process which implies that
superior information held by insiders who decide when to
exit and enter the public market."

8.

In evaluating a previously bought-out company returning
to public, investors, in addition to the information
provided by the prospectus, have access to stock-price
history at least.

9.

The median leverage level prior to the LBO is 43.2% for
the same sample.
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Chapter 3
AN APPLICATION OF THE FREE CASH FLOW HYPOTHESIS
TO Re-LBOs
3.1 Introduction
This section of the dissertation examines the validity of the
free cash flow hypothesis to the re-LBO sample.

The free cash

flow hypothesis, first proposed by Jensen (1986, 1988),
simply a variation of agency theory.

is

It has found widespread

application in various areas of finance, including LBOs.
Jensen argues that LBOs help solve the free cash flow
problem faced by cash-rich firms in industries with low growth
opportunities.

His argument is that higher debt service

obligations stemming from the buyout transaction preclude
management's abuse of free cash flow by investing in negative
net present value (NPV) projects.

In other words, management

is forced to pay out free cash flow in the form of debtservice payments on a regular basis.

Furthermore, a high-

equity stake provides incentives to improve cash flow, which
is necessary to meet debt payments and maximize the company's
value.

It is not clear, however, why management decides to

give up exploiting the free cash flow and assume the burden of
excessive debt.

This is only one of the questions to which

Jensen's free cash flow argument cannot provide a clear
answer.

29
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If debt creation is vital to bond their promise to pay
out future cash flows, management could pay out the excess
cash in the form of a dividend increase, a stock repurchase,
or even a leveraged recapitalization.

The free cash flow

hypothesis in general (see Reiter, 1994) and its applications
to rationalize LBO transactions in particular (see Frankfurter
and McGoun,

1996) have been questioned in recent finance

literature.

The return of LBO firms to public ownership puts

the free cash flow explanation of LBO transactions in serious
doubt, as does the fact that both management ownership and
leverage tend to decline following the IPOs (see Muscarella
and vetsuypens, 1990; and Mohan, 1990).

The latter facts are

in striking contrast to agency costs and free cash flow
explanations of LBO transactions.

Jensen's

(1986,

1988)

argument is supported only if reverse LBOs continue to exhibit
the typical post-buyout characteristics, such as high debt and
insider ownership levels (Van de Gucht, 1994).
In light of the above discussion, it is believed that the
applicability of free cash flow explanation to the re-LBO
sample is a real challenge for Jensen's
argument.

(1986)

infamous

That is, if indeed Jensen's argument is correct,

then free cash flow must be the main driving force behind the
buyout transaction regardless of a firm's past experience with
LBOs. Therefore, the free cash flow explanation must hold for
re-LBOs as well.
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3.2 Free Cash Flows and LBOs (Hx)

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the free cash
flow hypothesis as the motivation for LBOs.

Accordingly, the

following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 1:

The free cash flow explanation is

irrelevant to the LBO transactions.
To test Ht, free cash flow measures in the re-LBO firms are
compared with those in a control sample (non-LBO firms).

If

the free cash flow in re-LBO firms is significantly higher
than that in the control sample, one might conclude that free
cash flow may indeed be the reason for the re-LBO.

Similarly,

the absence of a significant difference between the two groups
should lead to the conclusion that free cash flow is not a
motive for going-private transactions, at least not for reLBOs.

A similar study has been done by Lehn and Poulsen

(1989) on LBOs.

Since the present study and the Lehn and

Poulsen study differ only in terms of buyout samples, the same
method of analysis is used in the current study.
3.2.1 The Lehn and Poulsen Study

Lehn and Poulsen (1989) analyze a sample of 263 successful
going-private transactions completed between 1980 and 1987 to
test the free cash flow hypothesis on two grounds:
(1) Do firms that go private have significantly greater
undistributed free cash flow than similar firms that have
not gone private?
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(2)

Is undistributed free cash flow an important determinant
of premiums paid in going-private transactions?
For

the

244

transactions

in the

sample

for

which

sufficient data were available, they report the following
average cumulative abnormal returns (all being statistically
significant at 1% level) associated with their announcements:
16.3% over
window,

the [-1,1] window, 19.9% over the [-10,+10]

and 20.5% over the [-20,+20] window.

They also

measure the average premium paid in these transactions,
computed

as

the

non-market-adjusted

return

(including

dividends paid) from 20 days before the buyout announcement to
the final price at which the firm's shares traded.

The

average value of the premium is 36.1% (t-statistic » 22.4).
It is the premium, rather than abnormal returns, that they use
in

searching

the

determinants

of

gains

accruing

to

shareholders in buyouts.
In examining the free cash flow hypothesis, Lehn and
Poulsen use two statistical methods of analysis. The first is
a logistic regression analysis that attempts to determine the
role of certain variables, particularly those proxying for the
free cash flow hypothesis, in determining the likelihood of
going private.
regression,

The second is an ordinary least-squares

which intends to explain the cross-sectional

variations in premiums paid in going-private transactions.
Following Lehn and Poulsen's work, this study examines
the free cash flow hypothesis on the same two grounds by using
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a sample of 21 re-LBO firms.

Lehn and Poulsen find a

significant relationship between undistributed cash flow and
a firm's decision to go private.
they

also

report

a

Parallel with this result/

statistically

significant

positive

relationship between free cash flow and the premium paid in
LBOs.

This observation leads them to conclude that a major

source of stockholder gains in going-private transactions is
the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash
flow.

Whether this conclusion can be generalized to re-LBO

firms is the concern of the current study.
3.3 Discussion of Method of Analysis and Proxy Variables
3.3.1 Logit Analysis

Logistic regression functions,

like the other regression

functions, are used to describe the nature of the relation
between the dependent variable and one (or more) independent
variable(s).

They differ from regular regression models,

however, in that they use a binary dependent variable.

The

value of the dependent variable indicates to which pre
specified groups a subject belongs.
The predicted values of the dependent variable are
expected to fall mainly in the interval between 0 and 1.

The

convention then is to interpret the predicted value of the
dependent variable as the probability of that subject's being
a member of the pre-specified group, given its characteristics
(i.e., the values of explanatory variables).
context, for example,

In the present

such a prediction would be to see

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

whether a firm is an MBO target or not.

The main interest of

this study, however, is to investigate the explanatory power
of the hypothesized firm characteristics in distinguishing
between buyout and non-buyout firms, rather than predicting
the probability of buyout for a hold-out sample.
The logistic regression model is of the following form:
Prob (yx=l) = Fffl'XJ,

(1)

where yL is a binary variable with "1" for re-LBO firms and
"0" for the control sample; F(/3'X) is the logistic function,
with

F(/3'X) =

e^'Vfl+e*'*); /3'X is

a

linear

function

of

several characteristics of subjects being studied; /3' is the
vector

of

unknown

parameters;

and

X

is

the matrix

of

independent variables.
In this study, the logit analysis contrasts the firms
that go private with a control sample of public firms to
explain the determinants of the likelihood of going private.
The matching criteria in creating the control sample are as
follows:

(a) four-digit SIC code1, and (b) market value of

equity at the end of the fiscal year preceding the year of the
going-private transaction.
Free cash flow hypothesis suggests that the proportion of
a firm's assets consisting of free cash flow should directly
relate

to

the

Accordingly,
undistributed

likelihood

of

a

firm's

going

private.

for each firm in both samples, a measure of
cash

flow

(CF),

for

the

year immediately

preceding the year of the going-private transaction,
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calculated.

CF, assuming that all positive NPV projects are

undertaken, should measure post-tax cash flow that was not
distributed to security holders in the form of interest or
dividend payments.

Therefore, CF is defined as

CF = INC - TAX - INTEXP - PFDDIV - COMDIV,

(2)

where:
INC = Operating income before depreciation (Compustat
item #13)
TAX = Total income taxes (Compustat item #16), minus
change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the
current year (change in Compustat item #35)
INTEXP = Gross interest expense on short- and long-term
debt (Compustat item #15)
PFDDIV = Total amount of preferred dividend requirement
on cumulative preferred stock and dividends paid on
noncumulative preferred stock (Compustat item #19)
COMDIV = Total dollar amount of dividends declared on
common stock (Compustat item #21)
Average

annual

percentage

increases

in

net

sales

(Compustat item #12) during the years (4, 3, and 2 years and
1 year) preceding the going-private transactions proxy for
growth prospects of each firm.

These variables are referred

to as SALESGRn, where n is the number of years included in the
calculation

of average growth value.

The sales

growth

variable is intended to proxy for profitable reinvestment
opportunities of cash flow.

Low growth prospects imply that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

firms have

few opportunities to reinvest the cash flow

profitably in their current lines of business.
Effective tax liability of each company, TAX, is also
included in the analysis.

Both the CF and TAX variables are

expressed as a percentage of EQUITY, the market value of
common stock at the end of the year immediately preceding the
year of the transaction.

TAX/EQ is expected to approximate

the maximum potential tax benefits associated with the goingprivate transaction since tax considerations may also affect
the likelihood of buyout transactions.

TAX/EQ may be highly

correlated, however, with a firm's undistributed cash flow,
CF/EQ.

The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two

variables, although not really large, is positive 0.41, but
not statistically significant at the 5% level.
The final variable included in the logistic regression is
THREAT, which takes the value of 1 if the firm received a
competing bid or was the subject of takeover speculation in
The Wall Street Journal, and 0 otherwise.

The role of this

qualitative variable is to test the importance of takeover
threats in going-private transactions.

The free cash flow

hypothesis predicts that the threat of hostile takeover is an
important impetus for going-private transactions.
The variables

discussed above form

the

independent

variables of the logit models to test whether any or all of
them will increase the probability of having an LBO.

The

dependent variable of the models takes the value of 0 for the
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control firms and 1 for LBO firms.

All the explanatory

variables are expected to have positive coefficient estimates
except for SALESGR, which should have a negative sign if the
free cash flow argument is in effect.
3.3.2 Bootstrap Algorithm for Statistical Significance Tests

A major problem exists with respect to the use of logistic
regression analysis in this study: the sample size.

In the

case of small samples, such as here, the estimates of standard
errors may not be reliable, thus leading to questionable
asymptotic t-tests.

To remedy this problem, the bootstrap

method introduced by Efron (1979) is used.3
The bootstrap algorithm randomly (with replacements)
picks a fixed number of observations from the original sample.
"By repeating this random sampling procedure, the bootstrap
can approximate the unknown true distribution of the estimator
with

the

empirical

Maddala, 1993).

'bootstrap'

distribution"

(Jeong

and

Bootstrapping is a tool to determine whether

asymptotic properties seem to hold in the small sample being
studied.

On average, the standard error of an estimator

estimated by a bootstrap algorithm is greater than the nominal
standard error (the one given by SAS, for example).

In

essence, what bootstrapping does is to capture finite sample
variability,

which is larger than the asymptotic sample

variability.

Therefore, bootstrap standard errors of the

estimator are used for the sake of a reliable t-test.
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The following steps are taken in the bootstrap algorithm
in estimating the standard errors and t-statistics of the
logistic regression coefficients*
(1) Estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables by
using the original sample in the logistic regression.
(2) Draw 1,000 random samples of the same size from the
original sample with replacement.
(3)

Estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables
for each of the 1,000 samples.

(4)

Estimate the standard deviation of each coefficient by
using 1,000 observations of each estimator.
The resulting set of standard errors (steps 2 through 4)

and the coefficient estimates

(step 1) are then used to

compute "bootstrap" t-statistics.
3.3.3 Ordinary Least-Squares Regression

The objective of this additional analysis is to ascertain
determinants of premiums paid in going-private transactions.
If free cash flow is an explanation for buyout transactions,
it (in addition to explaining variation in the likelihood of
going private) should explain cross-sectional variation in
premiums paid in going-private transactions.

Specifically,

premiums paid in these transactions should be directly related
to the level of the target's free cash flow.
As explained above, the average premium paid in these
transactions is computed as the non-market-adjusted return
(including dividends paid) from 20 days before the buyout
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announcement to the final price at which the firm's shares
traded.

Three of the variables— CF/EQ, TAX/EQ, and SALESGR—

are used as independent variables to explain the variation in
the premium.

As before, the expected signs are positive and

negative for CF/EQ and SALESGR, respectively, for the free
cash flow hypothesis to be a valid explanation of goingprivate transactions. Similarly, the sign of TAX/EQ should be
positive if potential tax savings are a source of premiums
paid to shareholders.
3.4 Empirical Findings
3.4.1 Re-LBO Sample Characteristics
Twenty

one

re-LBO

cases,

discovered

from

going-private

transactions that occurred between 1980 and 1995, are used to
test Ht.

A re-LBO firm is defined as one that converts a

publicly traded corporation (one that experienced a prior LBO
or divisional LBO with a subsequent return to public markets)
into a privately held corporation.
In constructing the re-LBO sample, various issues of the
following publications were first used to identify reverse LBO
firms:

Going Public-The IPO Reporter

(a publication

of

Investment Dealers Digest); Mergers & Acquisitions; W.T.
Grimm's Mergerstat Review; and The Yearbook on Corporate
Mergers, Joint Ventures and Corporate Policy.

In addition,

Investment Dealers Digest (IDD) Information Services provided
a comprehensive updated list of reverse LBOs that occurred in
the period 1980 to 1996. Also, Professor Chris J. Muscarella
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supplied a list of reverse LBOs generated by Kidder, Peabody
& Co. in 1988.
A careful examination of the above sources provided 450
reverse LBO firms.

Next, The Wall Street Journal Index was

searched for each individual reverse LBO firm (starting at its
reverse LBO date up to the current date) to see whether the
firm experienced a second management buyout following its
return to public markets.

This search process yielded 21 re-

LBO firms for the current study.
Table 3.1 reports various characteristics, grouped by
year, for the 21 re-LBO firms.

Full sample results are

presented in the last row of the table. The year in which the
second LBO occurs is given in the first column, which is
followed by the total number of going-private transactions
that qualify as re-LBOs for that year.

The third column

presents the average period that firms spend as a free
standing public

firms before

their

second

going-private

transaction; i.e., time span between their second initial
public offerings and their second LBOs.

The last two columns

display average value of equity and total value of equity.
Equity values are computed as the number of common shares
outstanding times the closing price of common stock at the end
of the fiscal year immediately preceding the re-LBO year.
Although the study covers a wide period, 1980 to 1995,
re-LBO firms are clustered in the years 1986 through 1989,
reaching a peak of nine transactions in 1988.

Total equity
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Table 3.1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TBE Re-LBO SAMPLE
Equity Value6
(Millions of Dollars)

Year

Number
of Re-LBOs

Average*
Public Life
(months)

1986

2

17.66

50.122

100.244

1987

3

33.38

162.814

488.442

1988

9

24.69

49.753

447.783

1989

4

41.73

99.260

397.041

1990

1

41.16

99.416

99.416

1991

1

71.26

31.341

31.341

1994

1

16.58

635.000

635.000

Full
Sample

21

31.12
(27.29)c

Mean

104.738
(82.356)d

Total

2,199.498

(a) Average time that the firm spent in the public markets after the
buyout firm is brought back to the market.
(b) Equity values are computed as the product of the common shares
outstanding and the closing price of common stock at the end of the
fiscal year immediately preceding the calendar year of the goingprivate transaction.
(c) Corresponding median value of public life for the full sample.
(d) Corresponding median value of equity for the full sample.

value

for

the

full

sample

is

$2,199,498,000,

with

a

corresponding median equity value of $82,356,000.
The majority of the re-LBOs occurred during the period
when the threat of hostile takeovers was extensive.

This

observation suggests that the 21 re-LBO transactions are the
result, at least partly, by the hostile takeover threat. On
the other hand, it may also be due to the fact that 1986 is a
reasonable year to start seeing re-LBO firms since leveraged
buyout transactions mainly started in the early '80s, and the
average time of private ownership for a reverse LBO firm is 34
months (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990). The average private
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life found in the present sample of 21 re-LBOs, 30.83 months,
is also consistent with Muscarella and Vetsuypens' reporting.
Moreover, the average public life of these firms following
their reappearance in the market is 31.12 months (median =
27.29 months), also comparable with their private life.
To examine empirically whether hostile takeover threats
have a role in the occurrence of re-LBOs, The Wall Street
Journal Index is searched to identify the sample firms that
either received a competing bid or were subject to takeover
speculation.

The qualitative variable THREAT should capture

the role of the takeover danger in the following logit
analysis.
3.4.2 The Announcement Effect of Second LBO Transactions:
An Event Study
A conventional market model event study is used to measure the
prediction errors in stock returns as follows:
PEi.t= Ri,t - (&i + b ^ ) ,

(3)

where Rift and R*,,. are daily returns for the stock of firm i
and

of

the

market

portfolio

at

time

t,

respectively.

Returns data are obtained from the CRSP (Center for Research
in Security Prices) tape.

Market return is proxied by the

return on the CRSP value-weighted index.

For each firm,

parameters a* and bx are estimated using OLS regression for
the period -170 to -21 relative to the announcement day.
The market model is then used to compute prediction errors
for the period beginning 20 days before the event day and
ending 20 days after, as shown in the above equation.
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relevant null hypotheses are that the average prediction error
(mean of prediction errors on any day across all 21 firms of
the sample) and cumulative average prediction errors (summed
average prediction errors across time for any event subperiod)
are zero.
To test whether prediction errors are significantly
different from zero, the following statistical tests are used:
the standardized residual z-test of Patell (1976), traditional
t-test

proposed

by

Brown

and

Warner

(1980),

and

the

standardized cross-sectional t-test suggested by Boehmer,
Musumeci, and Poulsen [BMP] (1991).5 The BMP-t test enhances
the efficiency and the power of the earlier tests as follows:
it

allows

for

event-induced

variance

changes

and

the

heteroscedastic event-day residuals, and it is adjusted for
out-of-sample prediction error. The average prediction errors
associated with the announcement of a going-private proposal
reported in The Wall Street Journal for the 21 transactions
are reported in Table 3.2.
On the announcement day, day 0, the average of prediction
errors
number.

is

27.88%— definitely an economically significant

All three statistical tests support the statistical

significance of the announcement day effect at 1% level. In
addition, 100% of the events (i.e., 21 re-LBO announcements)
have positive returns.
target

shareholders

This evidence supports the view that
realize

a

value

gain

in

the

transactions.
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Table 3.2
DAILY AVERAGE PREDICTION ERRORS (APE) FROM 20 DAYS BEFORE
TO 20 DAYS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 21 Re-LBOs
Percentage Sign-test* Traditional
BMP-t
Day
APE
Positive
Statistic t-statistic Patell-Z
-20 -0.002552
47.6
-0.31454
-0.78725
-0.94789
-0.21822
-19
0.020178
47.6
2.48662**
0.62490
-0.21822
0.34558
42.8
-0.65465
-0.67517
-18 -0.005478
-0.62286
-0.97986
-17
61.9
1.82188***
0.014784
1.09109
1.98618**
1.91286***
-16
0.032313
61.9
3.98210*
1.09109
5.57741*
2.04943***
-15 -0.003524
42.8
-0.65465
-0.43436
-0.25949
-0.18902
33.3
-1.52753
-0.93881
-14 -0.007618
-1.03202
-0.82621
-13 -0.003524
42.8
-0.65465
-0.43428
-0.29310
-0.24104
42.8
-0.65465
-0.84623
-12 -0.006866
-0.77878
-0.73514
61.9
1.09109
1.47293
-11
0.011952
2.12496**
2.22730**
-10
0.003678
57.1
0.65465
0.45326
0.70338
1.08312
-9 -0.018775
28.6
-1.96396**
-2.31370**
-1.50853
-1.09541
-8 -0.012052
57.1
0.65465
-1.48521
-0.80252
-0.58476
-7
0.022095
57.1
0.65465
2.72286**
1.81530*** 1.14691
-6
0.006457
38.1
-1.09109
0.79575
0.08292
0.06427
-5
0.002090
47.6
-0.21822
0.25758
0.48796
0.36127
-4
0.007733
38.1
-1.09109
0.95306
0.91213
0.84525
-3 -0.002380
42.8
-0.65465
-0.29331
-0.29331
-0.04429
-2 -0.001020
-0.12571
33.3
-1.52753
-0.29903
-0.24038
-1
0.003041
38.1
0.37476
-1.09109
0.87108
0.60385
0
0.278840
100.0
4.58258*
34.36340*
44.96070*
5.30307*
+1
0.008972
57.2
0.65465
1.10567
1.21003
1.83301***
+2 -0.001467
61.9
1.09109
-0.18083
-0.36350
-0.53020
+3
0.004602
52.4
0.21822
0.56722
0.66606
0.78365
+4
0.001163
42.8
0.14339
-0.65465
0.21262
0.55302
+5
0.008598
52.4
0.21822
1.05960
0.87494
1.28254
+6
0.028391
71.4
1.96396**
3.49876*
2.18885**
1.07134
+7 -0.004784
33.3
-1.52753
-0.58962
-0.69894
-1.47760
+8 -0.008632
33.3
-1.52753
-1.06383
-1.41372
-2.78438**
+9
0.001410
42.8
0.17379
0.17582
-0.65465
0.35581
57.1
+ 10
0.003277
0.40388
0.81825
0.65465
1.64618
38.1
+11 -0.002585
-0.31866
-0.29596
-1.09109
-0.68261
0.002853
47.6
0.35159
+12
-0.21822
0.30484
0.74948
+13 -0.013584
47.6
-1.70736
-0.21822
-0.77522
-0.51267
57.1
0.52231
+14
0.004238
0.65465
-0.07084
-0.07794
0.41972
0.37759
+15
0.003405
47.6
-0.21822
0.91431
-0.06008
+ 16
-2.40040**
0.03780
0.000306
23.8
-0.12314
-0.05279
0.05589
0.13939
+17 -0.000428
52.4
0.21822
-0.28511
0.11265
0.21822
0.15996
+ 18 -0.002313
52.4
0.66859
0.005311
57.1
0.65453
+ 19
0.65465
1.42204
-0.77939
-0.48414
+20 -0.006324
-0.65465
-0.81464
42.8
(a) Associated z-values testing the null hypothesis that percentage
positive is equal to 0.5.
***, **, and * mark 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance,
respectively, for two tailed tests.
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The announcement; date reaction by the market is well
above that reported by the earlier studies of LBOs.

This

discrepancy might be due to the fact that a re-LBO transaction
is quite different from a typical LBO; hence, its initiation
may contain additional information that is not present in
usual LBOs.

The reader should recognize that this result is

in line with the prediction of hypothesis

6, which

is

discussed in Chapter 5.
Figure 3.1 shows the cumulative average prediction errors
(CAPE) for the event window from day -20 to day +20.

This

figure allows for a clear observation of the instantaneous
response of the market to the re-LBO announcements; i.e., the
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Figure 3.1
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE PREDICTION ERRORS
FOR THE [-20, +20] EVENT WINDOW
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CAPE experiences a sudden and significant jump on the event
date.

Moreover, there seems to be no information leakage nor

any associated gradual stock price build-up during the pre
announcement period.
Stockholders certainly do realize a significant wealth
increase, as reflected by the 27.88% APE upon the initiation
of the buyout. The average premium paid in these transactions
is a better measure,

however,

of wealth increase

since

premiums are measured directly (i.e., not as an excess over
some predicted value) and over the full period (i.e., not only
at the announcement, but also including afterward) of the
going-private transactions.

In fact, the average premium is

48.44%, well above the APE at the announcement date, and
different from 0 at 1% level of statistical significance.

In

the following OLS regression analysis, premiums, rather than
APE, are used as the independent variable while searching for
the determinants of the premiums in re-LBO transactions.
3.4.3 Comparison of the Effect of re-LBO Announcements with
the Effect of LBO Announcements Documented in Previous
Studies

In general, findings of the present study are consistent with
those reported in prior studies.
results of selected papers.

Table 3.3 shows the main

The results are conclusive:

announcements of going-private transactions are associated
with significant positive excess returns. As a result, target
shareholders receive an economic gain from the implementation
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Table 3.3
SUMMARY OF GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTION STUDIES
Study

Period of
Study

Number of
buyouts

Event
Window*

CAPE1’
(%>

This study

1986-1994

21

[-U
[0]
[-1,0]
t-1,+1]
[-10,0]
[-10,+10]
[-20,0]
[-20,+20]

.30
27.88
28.19
29.08
28.97
33.12
33.94
37.15

Frankfurter and Gunay
(1992)

1979-1984

110

[-1]
[0]
[-1,0]

10.12
7.12
17.24

Amihud (1989)

1983-1986

15

[-20,0]

19.60

Lehn and Poulsen (1989)

1980-1987

244

[-1,+1]
[-10,+10]
[-20,+20]

16.30
19.90
20.50

Lehn and Poulsen (1988)

1980-1984

93

[-1,0]
[-10,+10]

13.93
20.76

Marais, Schipper, and
Smith (1989)

1974-1985

79

[-1,0]

13.00

Travlos and Millon (1987)

1975-1983

56

[-1,0]
[-10,+10]

16.20
19.24

Torabzadeh and Bertin
(1987)

1982-1985

48

[Month 0]

18.64

Grammatikos and Swary
(1986)

1975-1984

131

[-1,0]
[-10,0]

14.04
19.52

DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Rice (1984)

1973-1980

72

[-1,0]
[-10,+10]

22.27
28.05
(a) Day 0 is the event day, first announcement of the buyout offer
commonly retrieved from. The Wall Street Journal. The event window
is the event day plus and/or minus some number of days where the
sign on the day is relative to day 0.
(b) Cumulative average prediction errors.

of the leveraged buyouts.

Management, therefore, is not the

sole beneficiary in this potentially value-enhancing activity.
The gain accruing to target shareholders suggests that
they are not fully exploited by the initiators of these
transactions.

The target shareholders' gain may be capturing
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less than the total value of the firm after the LBO.

Note

that results of our study differ in that they indicate, for
any event window, a greater market reaction to the goingprivate announcements compared with the earlier studies.
the absence

of an accompanying statistical test,

In

it is

difficult to make a statement about this difference. However,
this observation may be an indication of market participants'
revised expectations.

That is, if market participants think

that they were fooled (in terms of splitting the gain with
managers) in the first deal of the re-LBOs, they expect a
higher premium for the second buyout.

The larger cumulative

average prediction errors of the current study may simply
reflect,

therefore,

the

market's

retaliation

in

second

buyouts.
3.4.4 A Preliminary Comparison of Re-LBO and Control Samples

The matching criteria in creating the control sample are as
follows: (a) four-digit SIC code, and (b) market value of
equity at the end of the fiscal year preceding the year of the
going-private transaction.

Firms that have the same four

digit SIC code and whose market value of equity most closely
matches the re-LBO sample firm's equity are selected for the
control firms.

Table 3.4 lists the mean value of the above

variables for both the going-private and control samples. The
fourth column reports the mean difference in the value of each
variable for each matched pair of going-private firm and
corresponding control firm.
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Table 3.4

MEAN VALUES OF VARIABLES FOR Re-LBO AND CONTROL FIRMS AND
CORRESPONDING t-STATISTICS FOR DIFFERENCE IN MEANS TEST
FOR MATCHED SAMPLES
Variable

Control
Firms

Re-LBO Firms

Mean
Difference

t-Statistic

104.730

89.788

14.938

0.847

CF/EQ

0.192

0.139

0.052

1.377

SALESGR1

0.338

0.149

0.189

0.851

SALESGR2

0.224

0.134

0.090

0.876

SALESGR3

0.285

0.137

0.148

1.288

SALESGR4

0.251

0.871

-0.620

-0.907

TAX/EQ

0.099

0.039

0.060

THREAT*

0.286

0.095

EQUITY
(Million $)

(a)

*
***

3.032*
1.620***

A z-statistic testing the difference between the proportions of
two groups in THREAT is listed instead of a t-statistic.
Two
non-parametric tests, Fisher's exact test and chi-square tests,
also provided p-values slightly higher than 0.10.
Statistically significant at a 1% level.
Statistically significant at a 10% level.

The associated t-statistic for difference in means test
is given in the last column.

This comparison should provide

an initial feel for the free cash flow hypothesis.
difference in equity value is not significant.

The mean

This is an

expected result since the control sample is matched,

in

addition to four-digit SIC code, by equity value. Contrary to
the prediction of free cash flow hypothesis, however, the most
important variable of interest of the study, CF/EQ, does not
convey a significantly larger mean value for the going-private
sample than for the control sample.

Average values of CF/EQ

are 0.192 and 0.139 for going-private and control samples,
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respectively. The average difference across the matched pairs
is 0.052, not different from 0 at the conventional levels of
statistical significance.
The mean values of the sales growth variables range from
0.224 to 0.338 for the re-LBO sample, and from 0.134 to 0.871
for the control group.

With the exception of SALESGR4, the

going-private sample is characterized by systematically higher
growth rates than the control group: a finding contrary to
Jensen's argument.

This finding is especially notable since

the control group is formed from the same industries as the
going-private sample. These differences in the mean values of
the

growth

variables,

however,

are

not

statistically

significant across the two samples.
The

finding

of

no

significant

differences

in

undistributed cash flow and growth rates across the two
samples is a serious challenge to Jensen's assertion that free
undistributed cash flow and relatively low growth rates are
the main characteristics of LBO targets. TAX/EQ, on the other
hand, is significantly larger in the going-private sample than
in the control sample.

Average TAX/EQ is 0.099 for going-

private firms and 0.039 for the control sample.

The average

difference across the matched pairs is 0.060, significantly
different from 0 at the 1% level.
measures

To the extent that TAX/EQ

approximate the maximum potential tax benefits

associated with going private, this result supports the tax
savings argument of LBOs documented in the literature.
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The last variable, THREAT, takes the value of 1 for 28.6%
of the going-private firms and for 9.5% of the control group.
This difference is hardly significant statistically (i.e., 10%
level), suggesting that going-private transactions, at least
re-LBOs, are not induced by the threat of takeovers.

This

casts another shadow of doubt on Jensen's free cash flow
hypothesis.
3.4.5 Determinants of the Likelihood of Going Private:
Logit Analysis

Table 3.5 reports results from four logit models in which the
dependent variable is 1 for the firms in re-LBO sample and 0
for the firms in the control sample.

The only difference in

each equation is the growth variable that is included as an
independent variable.

The remaining independent variables of

the models are CF/EQ, TAX/EQ, and THREAT.

Coefficients for

all four equations are estimated for the original sample. Two
different test statistics are reported for each coefficient.
The first is the asymptotic statistic reported by SAS; the
second is based on the standard error of each coefficient
obtained from the bootstrap algorithm.

As expected,

all

bootstrap t-statistics (except for the intercept term in model
3) are lower because of their higher standard errors.
The results reveal a direct relationship between TAX/EQ
and

the

likelihood

of

going

private.

Moreover,

this

relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level for
all four equations.

This systematic significant association

between TAX/EQ and the likelihood of going private persists
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Table 3.5

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LIKELIHOOD OF GOING PRIVATE

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

INTERCEPT
Asymptotic-t*
Bootstrap-tb

-1.4653
-2.0737**
-1.9550**

-1.5180
-2.1251**
-2.0502**

-1.4951
-2.0931**
-2.1663**

-1.5676
-2.0403**
-1.7865**

CF/EQ
Asymptotic-t
Bootstrap-t

-2.2584
-0.7407
-0.3852

-1.0588
-0.4438
-0.1905

-0.5028
-0.2344
-0.0888

-0.1976
-0.1013
-0.0292

TAX/EQ
Asymptotic-t
Bootstrap-t

20.6971
2.2142**
1.7449**

19.2986
2.1616**
1.6984**

18.5780
2.1147**
1.5429***

22.7165
2.2453**
1.3563***

SALESGR1
Asymptotic-t
Bootstrap-t

0.7306
0.9679
0.3118

Variable

0.8130
0.6644
0.2607

SALESGR2
Asymptotic-t
Bootstrap-t
SALESGR3
Asymptotic-t
Bootstrap-t

0.4999
0.3542
0.2172

SALESGR4
Asymptotic-t
Bootstrap-t

-0.3556
-0.7095
-0.1691

THREAT
Asymptotic-t
Bootstrap-t
Model
Chi-Square
(p-value)
(a)
(b)
**
***

1.8741
1.6412***
0.4350
12.0300
(0.0171)

1.8092
1.5884***
0.4372
11.4470
(0.0220)

1.7834
1.5730***
0.4400
11.1380
(0.0251)

1.7720
1.4925***
0.4492
13.6300
(0.0086)

The asymptotic t-statistic reported by SAS.
The t-statistic obtained through the bootstrap algorithm.
Statistically significant at the 5% level.
Statistically significant at the 10% level.

even in the case of bootstrap-estimated standard errors,
although, in the last two models, TAX/EQ is significant at the
10% level only.
The coefficient of THREAT has the anticipated positive
sign in all four equations; however, the coefficients are
statistically significant only at the 10% level. In fact, the
statistical significance of THREAT coefficients disappears at
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any conventional levels once t-statistics are calculated by
bootstrap standard errors.

Perhaps the most disappointing

result for the free cash flow hypothesis is the coefficient
estimates of CF/EQ and of four growth variables (SALESGR).
All

these

variables

insignificant
coefficients,

are

associated

coefficients;
with

the

with

moreover,

exception

of

statistically

the

signs

SALESGR4,

are

of
all

inconsistent with the prediction of free cash flow hypothesis.
That is, CF/EQ produces a negative sign and SALESGR yields a
positive sign (except for SALESGR4, which has an anticipated
negative sign) in all four equations.
Overall, the results are discouraging for the Jensen's
free cash flow argument.

None of the estimated coefficients

on CF/EQ and SALESGR are significant, and all but SALESGR4
carry signs inconsistent with the free cash flow hypothesis.
The estimated coefficients of THREAT, on the other hand, all
have the expected positive sign, but none are significantly
different from 0.
The results
buyouts, however.

support

the tax savings

rationale

for

TAX/EQ enters four equations with an

expected positive sign and is statistically significant in all
the equations.
3.4.6 Determinants of the Premiums Paid in
Going-Private Transactions: OLS Regression Analysis
The prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis is not limited
to explaining variations in the likelihood of going private.
Consequently, a conclusion, based on the previous section's
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finding/ would be incomplete.

One should also examine the

ability of the free cash flow hypothesis to explain crosssectional variation in premiums paid in these transactions.
If the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash
flows is a major source of stockholders' gains in buyout
transactions, then premiums paid in these transactions should
be directly related to the level of the target's free cash
flow.

A

similar

argument holds

for

the

target's

tax

obligation if tax savings are indeed an important source of
stockholders' gains in going-private transactions.
Hence, in the following paragraphs, the premiums paid in
21 re-LBO transactions are estimated as a function of CF/EQ,
TAX/EQ, and SALESGR.

Table 3.6 reports the results from

ordinary least-squares regressions of the premiums on the
three explanatory variables.4

As in logistic regression

analysis, a different SALESGR variable is used in each model.
The results are inconsistent with both the free cash flow
and the tax savings hypothesis.

The coefficient on CF/EQ is

significant only for the equation where SALESGR1 proxies the
reinvestment opportunities of the firms.

It does, however,

have a negative sign contrary to Jensen's explanation.
the

remaining

equations,

CF/EQ

appears

to

In all

have

no

statistically significant explanatory power for the premiums
and carries mixed signs.
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Table 3.6
OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF
PREMIUMS PAID IN GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

INTERCEPT

0.4128
(3.0730)*

0.3451
(2.1700)**

0.5333
(3.2270)*

0.4218
(2.4300)**

0.0293
(0.0660)

0.1448
(0.2890)

CF/EQ

-1.2984
(-2.1380)**

TAX/EQ

1.3540
(1.1660)

SALESGR1

0.5488
(3.8240)*

-0.4489
(-0.7090)
0.4761
(0.3440)

-3.0678
(-1.6980)***

-1.5995
(-0.8600)

0.7932
(2.2070)**

SALESGR2
SALESGR3

0.8812
(2.9240)*

SALESGR4

0.7722
(1.8950)**

R-Square

0.5263

0.3150

0.4137

0.2725

Adj R-Square

0.4427

0.1941

0.3102

0.1442

*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level,
and 10% level, respectively.

In contrast to its clear victory in explaining the
likelihood of going private, coefficient estimates for TAX/EQ
are not promising.

TAX/EQ enters the third equation as a

significantly (at 10% level) signed coefficient, but with an
economically

incorrect

sign.

The

remaining

coefficient

estimates for this variable also carry mixed signs and are not
significant.
Despite the fact that two major variables provide almost
no

explanatory

power,

R-square

values

of

the

models

(especially for the first and the third models) are notably
high.

Model 1 has an R-square value of 52.63% (adjusted for

degrees of freedom R-square value of 44.27%), and model 3 has
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an R-square value of 41.37%
31.02).

(adjusted R-square value of

This finding suggests that the third explanatory

variable of the model, SALESGR, is responsible for explaining
the cross-sectional variation in the premiums paid in second
buyouts.
This

is indeed the case.

SALESGR enters

all the

equations with a significant estimated coefficient.
coefficients

of

the

SALESGR

variable

are

The

statistically

significant at the 1% level for equations 1 and 3f and at the
5% level for equations 2 and 4.
The most intriguing aspect of the findings with respect
to SALESGR is that it has a positive estimated coefficient in
all four equations.

This result is inconsistent with the free

cash flow hypothesis.

In a similar case, Lehn and Poulsen

(1989) argue that SALESGR may actually proxy for the tendency
of managers to expend free cash flow on value-diminishing
projects that expand the size of their firm.

If so, the

direct relationship between the PREMIUM and SALESGR can be
interpreted as consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis.
In this explanation, however, it is not clear why managers are
willing to pay (and, by the same token, how stockholders can
demand) higher premium for a firm whose cash flows are already
wasted in value-reducing projects.
As an alternative explanation,

it is possible that

SALESGR may be proxying for the future growth potential.
Recall that these firms are experiencing their second buyouts
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after spending a relatively short period in the public arena
following their first buyout.

Accordingly, they might have

gone through various organizational changes that could have
enlarged their investment opportunity set both in the firm's
current or diversified line of business.
new firms.

In essence, they are

The upward trend in sales, combined with the fact

that management wants to buy out the company, may therefore be
a reflection of management's confidence in the future prospect
and growth potential of the firm. Assuming that this fact has
not been reflected in the stock price of the firm already, the
positive

relationship

between

the

SALESGR

and

PREMIUM

represents a revaluation of the firm's future growth prospects
(or future cash flows).
3.5 A Comparison of Results Obtained from the re-LBO Sample
with Lehn and Poulsen's Results
Recall that the only difference between the Lehn and Poulsen
study and the present one is the buyout samples.

The samples

differ not only in terms of the time period they cover, but
also in terms of the nature of buyouts.

That is, this study

uses a sample of re-LBOs rather than a sample of pure LBOs.
Therefore, our sample (21 observations) is noticeably smaller
than the sample of Lehn and Poulsen (244 observations).

The

period that Lehn and

The

Poulsen cover is 1980 to 1987.

going-private transactions of our sample, on the other hand,
are spread through over the period 1986 to 1994.
Both studies investigate the relevance of Jensen's free
cash flow hypothesis to LBOs. With the differences in the two
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samples,

these two

studies

produce

noticeably different

results.

First, the announcements of second LBO transactions

generate a higher CAPE than those of first LBOs.

For the

event window -1 to +1, for example, the present study finds a
CAPE of 29.08%.

The corresponding figure is 16.30% in Lehn

and Poulsen's study.
Second, Lehn and Poulsen find that the likelihood of
going private is directly related to the ratio of free cash
flow to equity value, and inversely related to the growth
rates in sales.

The same analysis is applied to our re-LBO

sample and produces statistically insignificant coefficients
for

all the

free

cash

flow

likelihood of going private.

proxies

in explaining

the

The only variable that appears

to have a significant role in the going-private decision is
the one that proxies for the tax savings potential of a firm
as a result of buyout, TAX/EQ.

This result is consistent with

the tax savings explanation of buyouts.

That is, the wealth

transfer from the IRS through reduced tax payments appears to
be a driving force behind re-LBOs as well.

The same cannot be

concluded for the free cash flow hypothesis.

The findings of

the present study suggest that the irrelevancy of the free
cash flow hypothesis to going-private transactions cannot be
rejected.
Third, Lehn and Poulsen find a positive significant
relation between the premium paid to shareholders and the free
cash flow variable.

They find the growth variable to be
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generally insignificant.

It is significant, however, in one

of the equations where it carries a positive sign contrary to
the prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis.

The results

of the present study suggest that the premiums paid in the
second buyouts are positively related to the growth rate in
sales.

This finding also contradicts Jensen's free cash flow

hypothesis.
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examines the free cash flow hypothesis
management buyouts.

in

If Jensen's free cash flow argument is an

explanation for going-private transactions in general, it must
be a major driving force behind re-LBOs as well.

That is,

regardless of a firm's past experience with LBOs, the free
cash flow argument must also hold for the second LBOs.
Based on the examination of 21 re-LBO firms, the study
finds no empirical support for the free cash flow hypothesis
of going-private transactions.

A comparison of these firms

with a control sample suggests that the likelihood of going
private is not related to the variables proxying the free cash
flow.

The tax savings argument of going-private transactions

still holds, however, for the re-LBOs.

The likelihood of

going private for the second time is positively related to the
tax savings potential of the firm.

This relationship is

statistically significant at the 5% level for all equations.
This systematic significant association between TAX/EQ and the
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likelihood of going private is robust to bootstrap-estimated
standard errors.
As opposed to its power in explaining the likelihood of
going private, TAX/EQ fails to explain the variation in the
premiums in a cross-sectional analysis.

The only variable

that appears to have explanatory power in explaining crosssectional variation is sales growth (SALESGR).

The most

intriguing aspect of the findings with respect to SALESGR is
that it has a positive estimated coefficient in all equations.
This result is also inconsistent with the free cash flow
hypothesis.
Lehn

and

Poulsen

(1989)

argue

that

the

indirect

relationship between the premium and sales growth may actually
exist and they support Jensen's argument. They try to justify
this argument by noting that the sales growth variable may be
reflecting the tendency of managers to expend free cash flow
on value-diminishing projects that expand the size of their
firm.

In this explanation, however, it is not clear why

managers are willing to pay (and, by the same token, how
stockholders can demand) higher premiums for a firm whose cash
flows are already wasted in value-reducing projects.
As an alternative explanation,

it is possible that

SALESGR may be proxying for the future growth potential.
Recall that these firms are experiencing their second buyouts
after spending a relatively short period in the public arena
following their first buyout.

Accordingly, they might have
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gone through various organizational changes that could have
enlarged their investment opportunity set both in the firm's
current or diversified line of business.
new firms.

In essence, they are

The upward trend in sales, combined with the fact

that management wants to buy out the company, may therefore be
a

reflection

of management's

confidence

in

prospects and growth potential of the firm.

the

future

Assuming that

this fact has not been reflected in the stock price of the
firm already, the positive relationship between the SALESGR
and PREMIUM represents a revaluation of the firm's future
growth prospects (or future cash flows) by the market.
Finally, the findings of the present study are consistent
with

those

reported

announcements.
associated with

in

earlier

event

studies

of

LBO

That is, the announcement of second LBOs is
positive average prediction errors.

The

average magnitude of the reaction by the market, however, is
somewhat above that reported by the prior LBO studies.

This

discrepancy might be due to the fact that a re-LBO transaction
is quite different from a typical LBO.

The initiation of a

re-LBO transaction may contain additional information that is
not present in LBOs.
3.7 Notes to Chapter 3
1.

The use of SIC codes in defining industries is a widely
used practice in both accounting and finance literature.
It should be noted, however, that this classification
scheme is
not perfect, and its accuracy has been
questioned
frequently in the recent literature. For
example, Kahle and Walkling (1996) study differences in
primary SIC codes for firms on Compustat and CRSP. They
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report that SIC classifications for the same firms differ
on CRSP and Compustat for approximately 80% at the four
digit level.
Guenther and Rosman (1994) also find
differences in SIC codes reported by Compustat and CRSP
and conclude that these differences may affect the
outcome of empirical research. Given such differences
between the two major sources of SIC codes (Standard &
Poor's Compustat and the University of Chicago's CRSP
databases), it is difficult to rely on the premise that
SIC classifications produce homogeneous industries.
2.

See Jeong and Haddala (1993) for a discussion of
bootstrap applications in econometrics.

3.

For a compact description of these test statistics, see
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991).

4.

The use of event-day prediction errors instead of
premiums did not provide any meaningful improvement on
the estimated coefficients or their interpretations.
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Chapter 4
M A N A G E M E N T ' S P E R C E P T I O N OF B U Y O U T S * A S U R V E Y

4.1 Introduction
Management's belief that it can increase the market value of
a

firm

through

the

buyout

transaction

reduces

to

an

information asymmetry issue in an MM world where the MBO by
itself cannot create value.

As discussed in Frankfurter and

Gunay (1993), managers and market participants perceive a
different value for the firm.

With the assumption that the

firm is undervalued, ". . . management also expects real
economic gains from the buyout" (ibid, p. 33).
A gap between market value and true value may persist if
management's information about a firm's operation is not (or
may not be) credibly conveyed to shareholders.

In the current

study, management, the acquirer, is viewed as possessing
valuable information that can be transformed into efficient
changes

in

organizational

the

firm's

investment,

activities.

The

production,

asymmetric

and

information

hypothesis also implies increased operating income following
the buyout (a finding that is attributed in earlier studies
solely to increased efficiency due to private ownership).
That is, because of their information advantage, managers
might, before the buyout, see an opportunity to increase the
value of the firm via operating improvements.

But they defer

implementation of these improvements until after the buyout,
thereby reserving most of the gains for themselves.

This,

63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

then, justifies the risk of paying too high a price and/or
using massive leverage, obtained at high interest rates (see
Madden et al., 1990).
Since the focus of this research is to investigate the
information advantage of insiders, gains expected and realized
by managers deserve particular attention.

To capture the

gains from investment, management seeks a way out of the LBO
through one of the following exit mechanisms: liquidation,
acquisition by an external party, private placing of shares,
or issuance of stock.

Since the consequences of each exit

route may differ substantially, the eventual exit mechanism
requires careful examination, presumably at the initiation
stage of the buyout.

This study focuses on only one exit

route: issuance of stock.
In

the reverse

LBO,

management,

having

achieved a

substantial paper gain in the value of its equity after
significantly increasing cash flow, sells the company back to
the public.

In addition to reducing the financial risk of the

firm by lowering the leverage, reversing the LBO through stock
market flotation affords the buyout investors, particularly
managers, the opportunity to reduce their personal risk via
portfolio diversification.

This constitutes the first stage

of the turnaround and is undertaken within a relatively short
period of the initial buyout.

Fuqua (1988) estimates the time

of the first stage to be three to five years.
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According to Ferenbach (1987), on the other hand, private
ownership lasts only one to two years.

The transitory nature

of the buyout might result from, among other things, the fact
that the mechanism was undertaken to exploit the private
information advantage.

This point is also noted by Kaplan

(1991) who reports that, for the sample of 183 LBOs completed
between 1979 and 1986, the median time spent as a private firm
was 6.8 years.

All of these indicate that buyouts are not

permanent, but are transitory. This finding supports the view
of the current study.
Re-LBO, in the context of the current study, refers to
the whole cycle initiated with the buyout of a public company,
followed by a public offering (reverse LBO), and ending with
a second buyout.
its

growing

The re-LBO, or re-leveraging, owes much of

popularity

to

the

existence

of

parties

(financiers) to invest in deals. Of course, this situation is
aided by the fact

that the company,

which has

already

successfully accomplished one round of leveraging, attracts
these investors.

As Cummings (1989) states, ". . . it has a

track record for managing successfully in a mode that features
high debt and a maximization of cash flow." The cycle implies
that managers, with their information advantage, take the firm
private when it is undervalued and bring it back to the market
when it achieves an acceptable market value.
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4.2
As

The Undervaluation Hypothesis (H2)
stated earlier,

the purpose of this

research

is to

investigate an observed phenomenon characterized by going
private via MBO, reobtaining public status through an SIPO,
and then going private a second time.

Under the assumption

that management possesses more information than shareholders,
a company is taken private through an LBO and eventually
brought back to the market.

The initial buyout occurs because

management, for whatever reason, believes that the market
undervalues the firm.

Hence, management sees an opportunity

to come back with a price more consistent with its perceived
value of the firm.

This proposition is expressed as the first

testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2:

LBOs are done because management

believes that the firm is undervalued.
4.2.1 Questionnaire Design
To discover the main incentive for an LBO,

a survey of

management's motivations regarding the buyout transaction was
conducted. The objective of the survey was to investigate the
CFO's perceptions of certain specific issues involved in
buyouts. The statements used in the questionnaire, therefore,
were drawn from interviews with managers of LBO firms in a
variety of business publications as well as from previous
research on MBOs.
The main point of interest in this survey is management's
beliefs about the divergence between the "true" value and the
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market value of their firms.

This so-called asymmetric

information explanation of buyouts suggests that insiders have
more or better information than the market. Several questions
are used in the questionnaire to investigate this point.
Statement

6, for example,

asks

respondents whether

the

divergence between the market value and the "true" value of
the firm's stock was the main motivation for the buyout.
Statement 10 seeks opinions on whether managers view the firm
as less valuable as a whole than as the sum of its parts.

(In

the absence of information asymmetries, either form should
make no difference.)
Statements 3, 4, 15, and 16 also seek to ascertain the
role of management's subjective beliefs in buyouts.
statement

15,

CFOsare asked whether their

performing better than industry peers.

In

company was

In prior evidence, a

common characteristic of buyout targets appears to be a
successful past but recent inferior performance compared to a
group of control firms.1 Statement 3 is essentially a portion
of statement 10, and, hence, should provide complementary
information.

Statement 16 also fits into this group and has

relevance for hypotheses 5 and 6 (in Chapter 5), since both
hypotheses are based essentially on the premium paid to pre
buyout shareholders.

Statement 4 focuses on the role of

takeover specialists in an effort to determine whether their
participation is necessary to determine and realize the gains
in a buyout.2 A disagreement with this statement contradicts
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the view that buyout specialists are one of the driving forces
behind improved efficiency in private organizations and may be
considered another piece of indirect evidence of managers'
information advantage.3
In

reverse

LBOs,

management,

having

achieved

a

substantial paper gain in the value of its equity, sells the
company back to the public.

This cycle may indicate that

managers, with their information advantage, take the firm
private when it is undervalued and bring it back to the market
when it achieves a market value acceptable to them.
happens,

presumably,

within

a

relatively

short

This

period,

possibly decided at the initiation stage of the buyout.

The

transitory nature of the buyout might result from the fact
that the mechanism was undertaken to exploit the private
information advantage.

Statements 13 and 14 explicitly deal

with these issues, and again seek to gather information for H2
and the remaining hypotheses in this study.
It is often indicated in the literature that managers may
even distort the operating data through manipulation of
accounting information to reduce the acquisition price.

For

example, Wu (1992), with a sample of 107 firms that were
subject to an MBO proposal between 1980 and 1987, finds that
managers depress operating income in the year before they
propose the buyout.

A corresponding decline in the stock

price enables managers to buy the firm for a lower price.

In

an attempt to explore the management manipulation hypothesis,
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statement 7 is included in the questionnaire. The question is
whether CFOs believe that there is
premium offered and recent trends in

any relation betweenthe
reported earnings per

share.
Another reason for management's desire to take the firm
private may be a takeover threat.

Statement 5 asks the

opinion of respondents regarding theincumbent management
team's destiny in a target firm after a third-party hostile
takeover, statement 12 further examines the "takeover threat"
by asking managers whether their firm was subject to a
takeover by an outside group.

Note that a disagreement with

statement 12 strengthens the role of other possible motives,
including information asymmetry, in buyout transactions. That
is, a management buyout initiated by a takeover threat is a
self-preservation mechanism and attempts to block the hostile
takeover attempt rather than exploit an information advantage.
Shleifer and vishny (1988) argue that this is particularly
true for very large firms where ". . . the primary impetus
behind the MBO is often not the prospect of making a large
acquisition profit, but rather the threat that someone will do
so at management's expense" (ibid., p. 92).
There has been a growing debate about MBOs from a number
of ethical perspectives (see Filatotchev et al., 1994; Jones
and Hunt, 1991; Bruner and Paine, 1988; and Houston and Howe,
1987, for example).
the

utilitarian

Jones and Hunt (1991), in opposition to

defense

of

buyouts,

argue

that
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transactions

do

not

maximize

the

net

utility

of

all

stakeholders affected by the deal or the net utility of
society as a whole.

In fact, a generally negative effect on

social mores has been suggested. According to Filatotchev et
al. (1994), this negative effect ". . .is epitomized in the
description of corporate raiders as individuals who know the
price of everything and the value of nothing!"

This makes

management motivation in buyouts suspect, at least from a
moral perspective.
Statement 17 is drawn from Magowan's article (1989) on
Safeway's LBO experience.
president.)

(Magowan was the company's CEO and

Statement 17 seeks to determine whether managers

accept the clear conflict in MBOs as opposed to an outside
takeover. Managers may be well aware that the company's
activities could be organized profitably, but they may be
reluctant to do so without capturing the whole reward for
their

substantial

efforts.

Withholding

the

privileged

information about potential value-additive activities and
hence the true value of the firm allows them to bid a lower
price in buying out the company.
involved

in

buyouts

and

the

So, the ethical issues

undervaluation

(asymmetric

information) hypothesis are essentially linked.
Statements 2 and 11 also focus on ethical issues involved
in buyout transactions.

Statement 11 seeks to confirm the

findings of Frankfurter and Gunay (1993) by directly asking
managers whether the premium in a buyout is larger, ceteris

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

paribus, when incumbent management also sells off some of its
shares.

Statement 2 makes the point that,

in a buyout,

management acts on both sides of the deal. On one side, it is
the agent acting on behalf of the shareholders to determine
whether both the sale of the firm and the offer price are in
their best interest.

On the other side, management acts

according to "me-first" rules.

This is clearly a conflict of

interest stemming from a principal-agent relationship.
Statements 1, 8, and 9 focus on another conflict of
interest

that

may

be

present

between

shareholders of publicly held companies.

management

and

Statement 1 asserts

that a buyout allows management to focus on long-term growth
and profitability, whereas statement 8 states that outside
shareholders exert pressure to increase earnings figures for
the next quarters. Presumably, a buyout frees management from
responsibility to, and demands from, stockholders. Management
is no longer concerned about market pressures or short-term
prospects. Without the obligation to create satisfying short
term reports for stockholders, management can focus on long
term growth and profitability.
For a sample of large MBOs, Lowenstein (1985) reports a
median value of 10.4% management ownership following the
buyout, compared with a median 3.8% before the transaction.
This

10.4%

management ownership

is

consistent with

the

findings of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) who report a 5%
to 10% range of management ownership for the best performing
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firms.

The conventional wisdom is that increased percentage

ownership raises management's personal benefit from improving
efficiency,

and

hence,

induces

management

additional value out of the firm's assets.

to

squeeze

Statement 9 seeks

to determine whether the incentive of managers increases after
the buyout.
4.2.2 Construction of the Survey Sample
The survey sample is constructed from 600 companies that have
gone through an MBO.

For the purposes of this study, an MBO

is defined as the purchase of a corporation or a division by
a group that includes some members of management; e.g., the
board of directors and the top officers of the corporation.
The study covers the period 1980 to 1995.

Several

sources are used in constructing the sample:
(1)

Going

Public-The

IPO

Reporter,

Investment Dealers Digest.

a

publication

of

The January 18, 1988, issue

had a list of 45 reverse LBO firms.
(2)

Mergers

& Acquisitions.

Various

issues

include

a

selected set of LBO companies that have gone public. The
November/December

1987,

November/December

1990,

and

November/December 1991 issues listed 44, 14, and 21 such
firms, respectively.
(3)

W.T. Grimm's Mergerstat Review.

Eleven annual editions

between 1985 and 1995 were used to identify MBO firms.
Nine additional MBO firms were identified from pages 1429 and page 77 in the 1990 edition.
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(4)

The Yearbook on Corporate Mergers, Joint Ventures and
Corporate Policy.

This is an excellent source for the

purpose at hand, but it was available for the years 1985,
1986, and 1988 only.
(5)

Investment Dealers Digest (IDD) Information Services.
Mr.

David

Kwateng

at

IDD

in

New

York

provided

a

comprehensive, updated list of reverse LBOs that occurred
in the period 1980 to 1996.
(6)

Previous studies in the literature on MBOs.
identify a number of LBOs:

These

278 in Lehn and Poulsen

(1989); 33 in Liebeskind, Wiersema, and Hansen (1992);
and 51 in Opler (1992).
(7)

Professor Chris J. Muscarella.

He supplied a list of 90

reverse LBOs generated by Kidder, Peabody & Co. in 1988.
The final sample of MBOs includes those transactions that
satisfy the following criteria:

The Wall Street Journal

contains an announcement that the company proposed to go
private,

wherein

at

least

one member

of

management team will have an equity interest.

the

incumbent

This search

process yielded a sample of 600 firms eligible for the survey.
A mail questionnaire (see Appendix) including the 17
closed-end statements discussed above was used to survey one
of the following individuals in each company: the chief
financial

officer,

treasurer,

or

the

vice

president of

finance.4 The possible response to each statement ranges, on
a continuous scale, from strong disagreement (0) to strong
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agreement (4).

The middle of the scale (2) represents the

respondent's neutrality with regard to the statement, and the
lack of a response entirely is interpreted to mean the
statement is irrelevant for that firm.

In order to improve

the response rate and reduce potential non-response bias, a
second mailing was sent within 4 to 6 weeks to those who did
not reply initially.
Of the 600 firms originally selected for the sample, 33
were excluded because of insufficient addresses, resulting in
an initial sample of 567.

The two completed mailings yielded

a total of 131 valid responses, a 23% response rate.
4.1

Table

(pages 75 and 76) presents a simple tabulation of the

responses.
4.3

Results and Discussion

Table 4.1 shows the statements and the summary statistics
derived from the responses.

To provide an easy interpreta

tion, statements are presented in the order of functional
clusters discussed in Section 4.2.1 rather than in the order
in which they appeared in the questionnaire.
attached

to

each

questionnaire.

statement

indicates

its

The first number
order

in the

The number in parentheses, on the other hand,

shows the rank of the statements sorted in descending order
according to the rate of agreement.

The first three columns

following the statement present the frequency (as a percentage
of all responses to that statement) of responses expressing
disagreement (scale values smaller than 2), neutrality (scale
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Table 4.1
M A N A G E M E N T ' S PERCEPTION O F BUYOUTS:

SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE SURVEY

DISAGREE

NEUTRAL

The main motivation for our buyout waa our
opinion that prebuyout market prices of our
stock did not reflect their "true* value.

34.4

11.5

54.1

1.57

2.23

2.45

3.00

1.38*

10.
(5)

A buyout la an appropriate strategy In a firm
for which the partB are worth more than the
whole.

13.1

16.9

70.0

5.35

2.68

3.00

3.00

6.99***

3.

It la easier for a private firm to Bell
assetB or divisions than It Is for a publicly
held company.

18.3

11.5

70.2

3.83

2.66

3.00

3.00

6.31***

4.
(14)

It is necessary to rely on outside
consultants and takeover specialists to
determine the gains of a buyout.

55.7

14.5

29.6

0.53

1.56

1.40

1.00

-3.21***

15.
(12)

Before the buyout my company was performing
better than comparable firms within the same
industry.

29.9

16.5

53.5

1.79

2.20

2.20

2.00

2.48***

16.
<7)

Premiums paid to shareholders In a buyout are
not necessarily indicative of the difference
between the market value of the stock and
management's belief about the "true" value of
the stock.

13.1

20.0

66.9

5.12

2.51

2.65

3.00

6.73***

13.
(3)
14.

The equity investors in a buyout usually go
public again in three to five years.

6.2

20.0

73.8

12.00

2.68

3.00

3.00

8.49***

The equity Investors receive a return on
their investment commensurate with the risk
they take.

10.0

13.1

76.9

7.69

2.84

3.00

3.00

8.05***

The premium offered is affected by the recent

27.3

15.6

57.0

2.09

2.25

2.35

3.00

3.32***

STATEMENT®
Information Asymmetry
6.
(U)

(4)

(2)
7.

AGREE

RATIOb

MEAN

MEDIAN

MODE z-value0

(9) trend in reported earnings per share.
(a)The number that, appears within parentheses attached to each statement displays the rank of the statements if they were
sorted in descending order according to their agreement rate.
(b)Ratio for each statement is computed as followsi Number of Agreeing Respondents/Number of Disagreeing Respondents.
(c)z-value is the test statistic for hypothesis that the proportions of agreeing and disagreeing respondents for each
statement are equal.
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, and *** significant at 1% level.
(Table cont'd.)
^1

U1
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STATEMENT*
Takeover Threat

DISAGREE

NEUTRAL

AGREE

RATIOb

MEAN

MEDIAN

MODE z-value°

5.
(6)

In a hostile takeover, Incumbent management
of the target firm is replaced.

13.2

18.6

68.2

5.18

2.62

3.00

3.00

6.67***

12.
(16)

The main motivation in our buyout was that
the firm was subject to a ho&tile takeover.

72.2

5.6

22.2

0.31

1.08

0.45

0.00

-6.11***

-3.58***

Ethical Issues
17.
(15)

There is an element of disloyalty in a
management-led buyout since it amounts to
admitting that management will do a better
job for themselves than they did for
shareholders.

53.5

18.9

27.6

0.51

1.54

1.70

2,00

2.
(13)

In management buyouts there is a conflict of
interest on the part of the management in
that it is acting on both sidea of the
transaction as buyer and seller of a company.

37.7

19.2

43.1

1.14

2.02

2.00

2.00

11.
(17)

The premium in a buyout is larger, other
things being equal, when incumbent management
also sells off some of its shares.

46.4

32.8

20.8

0.45

1.70

2.00

2.00

-4.00***

26.7

19.1

54.2

2.03

2.28

2.30

2.00

3.49***

0.58

Conflict of Interest
1.

(10)

A buyout allows management to focus on long
term growth and profitability.

8.
(1)

Outside shareholders exert pressure in a
publicly held company to increase or at least
maintain previous quarters' earnings figures.

5.3

5.3

89.3

16.71

3.15

3.20

3.00

9.88***

9.
(8)

Firm performance improves after a buyout
because of a closer relation between
management action and rewards.

22.1

13.7

64.1

2.90

2.57

2.80

3.00

5.17***

(a)Ths number that appeara within parentheaea attached to each atateaent diaplaya the rank of the statements if they were
aorted in descending order according to their agreement rate.
(b)Ratio for each atateaent la computed aa followai Number of Agreeing Respondents/Number of Diaagreeing Respondents.
(c)z-value is the teat statistic for hypothesis that the proportions of agreeing and disagreeing respondents for each
statement are equal.
* Significant at 108 level, ** significant at 58 level, and *** significant at 1% level.
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value 2),

and agreement

respectively.

(scale values

greater than 2),

Also displayed in columns 5 through 8 are the

ratio of agreement to disagreement responses, the mean, the
median, and the mode for each statement.

The last column

provides test statistics and associated table values for the
hypothesis that the proportion of agreeing and disagreeing
respondents is equal.

Put another way, agreeing respondents

expressed as the percentage of agreeing plus disagreeing
respondents is hypothesized to be equal to 0.5.
following

discussion

focuses

on

the

Since the

agreement

versus

disagreement rate for each statement, it might be informative
to note

that,

except for statements

2 and

6,

all the

statements are associated with a significant z-value.
Evidence of underpricing of the firm's equity relative to
fundamental

value is tenuous,

possibly because it

"runs

counter to the efficient market hypothesis, which has been the
bedrock of financial economics for many years" (Shleifer and
vishny, 1988).
that

attempt

Of particular interest are those statements
to

determine

the

undervalued

stock/firm

perception by management.
The statistics for statements 6 and 10 show that, in the
making of buyout decisions, divergence between the market and
perceived value of the firm plays an important role.

The

majority of respondents agree with both of these statements.
In fact, statement 10, having an agreement rate of 70%, is
among those showing the highest percentage of agreement.
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There is a very close agreement rate for statement 3 (70.2%)
which/ as discussed before, was introduced as a complement to
statement 10.
Statements 15 and 16 are also in agreement, which is
particularly substantial for statement 16 (a 66.9% agreement
frequency and a ratio of 5.12).

Proponents of LBOs argue

that, in new private organization, there is a significant
efficiency improvement. This, in turn, is realized as a value
gain, part of which accrues to pre-buyout shareholders in the
form of premium (somewhere around 50%) over the prevailing
market price of the stock.

Of course, a sudden enormous gain

is definitely desirable by shareholders and fits one of the
core assumptions of corporate finance in that the objective of
management is to increase the value of the

stock/firm.

However, as reflected in statement 16, managers do not deny
that

they

do

not

let

all

the

potential

gain

flow to

shareholders.
As far as statement 15 is concerned, recall that a
successful past, followed by a recent inferior performance, is
a common characteristic of buyout targets.

Moreover, Wu

(1992) reports a management-induced depression in operating
income, with a corresponding decline in stock price in the
year before the buyout proposal.

These facts suggest that

management's opinion that the company is performing better
than industry peers is formed mainly by their "subjective
beliefs" and/or private information rather than stock market
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or publicly available financial measures; or, they want to
hide

their

separately,

intention.
the

It

responses

would
at

be

the

useful

two

to

study,

extremes,

using

accounting and market data.
Many, if not all, the questions discussed above are
designed to address the undervaluation hypothesis, which seems
to be supported by the analysis so far.

That is, the firm is

perceived to be more valuable as parts than as a whole, the
pre-buyout market price does not reflect the "true" value of
the stock, and the premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders do
not exhaust the gains to be realized by managers.
the

results

for

statement

14

indicate,

respondents view management buyouts

In fact, as

76.9%

of

the

as highly profitable

strategies, providing them with a sufficient return to cover
not only their effort but also the risk they face.
Statement 13 ties in with statement 14 and provides
support for both the first and second hypotheses.

Combined,

these two hypotheses can be restated as follows:

LBOs are

induced by perceived undervaluation of the firm by management
whose intention is to realize a profit with the company going
public again.

Three to five years' life expectancy for the

private

(emphasized

form

in

statement

13)

receives

an

agreement rate of 73.8%, which is the third highest among the
17 questions covered in the survey, and has an agreement-todisagreement ratio of 12.

This result supports the idea put

forth by Ainina and Mohan (1991) that the buyout is ". . . a
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process which implies that superior information is held by the
insiders who decide when to exit and enter the public market"
(ibid., p. 394).

Such a strategy definitely runs counter to

the many explanations for going-private transactions given in
earlier studies because their strong argument on the behalf of
going private transactions has no room for a quick return to
public markets.

These explanations include, for example,

savings of public-ownership expenses, increased managerial
ownership (convergence of interest), and buyout specialist
monitoring.
The highest rate of disagreement, 72.2% and 55.7%, is
with statements 12 and 4, respectively.

Contrary to common

belief and previous empirical findings, statement 4, with a
0.53 agreement-to-disagreement ratio, indicates that outside
consultants and/or takeover specialists are not considered
important to the success of a buyout.

Responses to statement

12 indicate that a third-party hostile takeover attempt is not
the main reason for an MBO.

This finding strengthens other

possible explanations for a buyout, including the information
advantage of managers.

It also removes any potential bias

that might have been brought in by the dominance of "hostile
takeover" MBOs in the survey group.
agreement

frequency and a 5.18

As reflected in a 68.2%
agreement-to-disagreement

ratio, the response to statement 5 indicates that managers
view hostile takeovers as a definite threat.
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A less common version of the asymmetric information view
argues that managers misrepresent pre-MBO earnings to make the
company appear unattractive, thereby reducing the purchase
price.

Although they do not provide direct evidence in

support of this view, the responses to statement 7 do indicate
that managers believe that the recent trend in reported
earnings is an important determinant of the premium offered to
pre-buyout shareholders.

This finding, together with the

conclusion of Wu (1992), implies that there is a great deal of
incentive to distort accounting information.
Statements 2, 11, and 17 address the ethical issues
involved in the management-led going-private transactions. A
common feature of the responses to these statements is the
high neutrality rate.

In a range of 5.3% to 32.8% for

neutrality for the entire set of statements in the survey,
statements 11, 2, and 17 have a rate of 32.8%, 19.2%, and
18.9%, respectively.

Overall, the evidence on the ethical

side of the buyouts is somewhat mixed: the respondents tend to
agree there is a conflict of interest in MBOs as managers act
as both buyers (in their own interest) and as sellers (in the
stockholders' interest) in the same deal.
buyout

transactions

as

responsibilities, however.

a

shrugging

off

They do not view
of

fiduciarial

In fact, inherent in an MBO, there

appears to be the expectation that "we can and will do a
better job for ourselves than we did for shareholders."

In

addition to providing an idea about management's opinion on
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the ethical issues involved in MBOs, the responses to these
statements can be considered valuable evidence (as reflected
by the high neutrality rate for all three statements and a
dominating disagreement rate for statements 11 and 17) that
the questionnaires were responded to by knowledgeable people.
The last group of statements, 1, 8, and 9, pertain to
possible

conflicts

shareholders.

of

interest

between

managers

and

Statement 8, with a 89.3% frequency rate,

receives the highest agreement among all statements of the
survey. The obligation to satisfy stockholders through short
term earnings performance acts as a clear constraint and is
somewhat troublesome to managers.

As an a priori expectation

grouped with statement 8, statement 1 (although not as strong
as

its

counterpart)

respondents.

also

receives

an

agreement

from

It has an agreement frequency of 54.2% and an

agreement-to-disagreement

ratio of 2.03.

As mentioned,

statement 9 also aims to shed light on the conflict-ofinterest dimension

of

the MBOs.

The

increased

equity

ownership of management, together with its investment of human
capital in the firm, can act as a powerful incentive.

Under

this scenario, managers' decisions will unambiguously aim to
increase the firm value as opposed to counteracting objectives
that may be pursued in the pre-LBO firm.

This statement

receives a 64.1% agreement frequency and a 2.90 agreement-todisagreement ratio, supporting the convergence of interest
hypothesis (i.e., agency theory) in corporate finance.
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4.3.1 Factor Analysis and Clustering

Factor analysis is generally used to summarize or condense the
information in a large set of variables into a set of
components, which/ in turn, enables the analyst to examine the
common underlying patterns in the data.
context,

the objective is not to

In the present

identify or name

the

underlying factors, but rather to use the information to group
respondents into several clusters of shared perceptions.

The

lack of significant differences among these clusters with
respect to any of the survey statements should reveal a
homogeneity in management's perceptions.
The results of principal component factor analysis are
presented in Table 4.2. Eigen values, percentage of variance,
and the accounted-for cumulative percentage of total variance
are shown in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
The

latent

components

root criterion

having Eigen values

suggests

retaining

greater than 1.0.

those
This

selection results in six components, which account for 57.2%
of the total variance. The Eigen values indicate the relative
importance of each factor in accounting for the variance
associated with the set of variables.

Factor 1, having the

highest Eigen value, accounts for most of the explanation of
the variance, 13.6%.

The total amount of variance extracted

by six factors is 9.71.
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Table 4.2
RESULTS FOR THE EXTRACTION OF COMPONENTS
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

A

Eigen Value
2.30885
1.85333
1.76949
1.41367
1.29173
1.08156
.96512
.91030
.82038
.78305
.74342
.70954
.57535
.53491
.45888
.42003
.36039

supporting

device

Percentage
of Variance

Cumulative
Percentage

13.6
10.9
10.4
8.3
7.6
6.4
5.7
5.4
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.2
3.4
3.1
2.7
2.5
2.1

to

decide

components to retain is the scree curve.

13.6
24.5
34.9
43.2
50.8
57.2
62.8
68.2
73.0
77.6
82.0
86.2
89.6
92.7
95.4
97.9
100.0

how

many

principal

Figure 4.1 presents

the scree curve that plots the Eigen values associated with
each component in successive order of its extraction. Results
of the scree test in this case suggest two additional factors
since it appears that a break occurs after the eighth factor.
Moreover, the Eigen values for these two factors, which are
0.965 and 0.910, respectively, are very close to the latent
root criterion value of 1.0. The following analysis is based
on these two extra factors as well. The eight factors explain
68.2% of the total variation.
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Factor Number

Figure 4.1
SCREE CURVE OF EIGEN VALUES

Component loadings for the eight factors are displayed in
Table 4.3.

The underlined values represent each variable's

highest loading (in absolute value).

In some cases, the

values represent the two highest loadings if they are similar
in size.

The last column, designated communality, summarizes

how each variable is explained by the eight factors extracted.
Communalities associated with statements 1-2, 4-9, 11-14, and
16-17 are all at or above 0.63.5 This indicates that a large
portion of the variance in these statements has been extracted
by the present factor solution.

The communality figures for

statements 3, 10, and 15 are smaller, however, suggesting that
they have less in common with the other statements.
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Table 4.3

UNROTATED COMPONENT LOADINGS AND COMMUNALITIES
Factors
Statement
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

.473 -.200 -.253
.473
.174
.211 .114
.544 .296 -.052 -.485 -.062
.168 -.014
.043
-.484
.472 -.202 -.073
-.257
.143
.441 -.377
.278 .411 -.072
.160 -.067
.146 .252 .493 -.039 -.010 -.216 -.087
.610
.276 .157 -.175
.232
.200 -.170

11

.353 .322
.274 .066
.562 -.540
.422 -.318
.301 .369

12

-.104 -.244

13
14
15

-.279 -.052
.011 -.650
.301
-.423

16
17

-.387
.427

.155
.431

8

Communality

.159
-.035
-.044
.137
-.693

0.665
0.657
0.594
0.639
0.866

-.064
.157
.157
-.092
-.107

0.631
0.781
0.707
0.680
0.596

.190
.187
.193 -.369
.531
.269 -.455
.409
.000 .393
.200
.110
.029
.036 -.090
.179
.008 -.328
.337
.224
.048
.481
.367
.158 -.200 -.052
.618 -.055 -.198 -.181 -.225
.462
.627
.165 -.040
.235
.264
.024
.373 -.011 -.191 -.019
.066 -.189
.059
.038
.194 -.150 -.078
.654 .158 -.012
.225 -.287
.014
.002 -.409
.297
.321
.188

.070
.412

0.665
0.794
0.630
0.709
0.521
0.694
0.758

An initial examination of the factor loading pattern
reveals that a clear-cut interpretation is difficult since, in
many cases, different factors get almost the same amount of
loading from the same variable.

This necessitates a rotation

of the factor matrix to redistribute the variance so that a
simple loading pattern can be reproduced for an unambiguous
interpretation.
The results of the orthogonal varimax rotation method are
shown in Table 4.4.®

The highest loading for each variable

(in absolute value) across the eight factors is underlined.
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Table 4.4
VARIMAX ROTATED COMPONENT LOADINGS
Factors
Statement:

l

1

.425

2

.188

3

.518

4

.077

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

.033
-.076
-.009
.062
.699
.733
.050

14
15
16
17

.281
-.455

.032
.074

-.077
-.124

2
-.129
.746

3

4

6

5

.238

-.105

-.154

.048

7

8

-.307

-.002
-.396

.510
-.020
-.329

.107
.070

.077

.040
.066

.211

-.211
-.034

.788

-.037

-.015

.061

.014
-.019

.062
.104

-.022
.006
.170
-.405
-.134
.091
.459

-.031
-.177

-.013
-.064
-.155
.178
-.219
.189

-.049
.758

.923
.019

.056
.078
.245
-.090

.095
-.010
.102
.026
.434
-.017
.190
.059
.153
-.050
.105

-.005
.398
.016
.068
.116
.008
-.293
-.244
-.421
.039
.740

-.038
.009
-.502
.240
.021
.229

-.007
.039
.232
-.002
.279
.855
.347
.434
.137
-.073
.319

.155
.042
.581
-.044
.103
.807

.361
-.238
-.079
.329
.013
-.075
.127

-.096

.144
.105

Statements loading on factor 1 are 3 , 9, 10, and 15.

.018
.052
.845
.583
-.016
.024
.129
.009
.191
-.119
.159
-.145
.052

Notice

that, except for 9, these statements have been presumed to be
related to the undervaluation hypothesis of LBOs.

Also

noticeable is the negative sign of statement 15's loading.
Factor 2 is dominated by statements 2 and 17.

Both of

these statements are assumed to be related to ethical issues
in management-led buyouts. The third statement, statement 11,
included in this group as a priori, however, loads on factor
3, along with statements 4 and 14.
negative

Interestingly,

sign of 14 may be interpreted

the

(considered with
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statement

4) that management

believes

that

there

is

a

sufficient return for equity investors in buyouts and that
they do not want to share it with buyout specialists.
The only underlying statement of factor 4 is statement 12
with its significant loading of 0.855.

Factor 7 is the only

other component that attracts just one statement (statement
5).

These two statements were grouped together a priori with

the expectation that they would capture the third-party,
hostile-takeover dimension of the buyouts.
Factor 5 is loaded with statements 13 and 16.
they

were

discussion,

covered
these

in

different

two

groups

statements

in

also

Although

the

initial

address

undervaluation/asymmetric information issue.

the

Statement 6,

which deals directly with undervaluation of stock prior to the
buyout, and statement 1 load together on factor 6.

Factor 8

captures the remaining two statements, 7 and 8.
Being, in a sense, a condensed representation of several
statements, the eight factors are all believed to be the most
relevant
clustered.

variables

in

characterizing the

objects

to be

The factor scores, therefore, are saved for use in

the following cluster analysis.

This search should indicate

whether the respondents can be partitioned into relatively
homogeneous subsets based on the interobject s i m i larities.
The objective, therefore, is to specify the number of clusters
and examine their similarities.
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In the absence of a priori information or expectation
about the number of groups that may prevail, the first step in
the analysis takes an exploratory path and aims to ascertain
the number of groups,
interobject

in partitioning the data, two different

similarity

measures

squared Euclidian distance)

(Euclidian

distance

and

and two different clustering

algorithms (average linkage and Ward's method) are used.
At first, an agglomerative hierarchical procedure is run
for each of the algorithms in the aforementioned statement.
Since the results of the average linkage method do not
indicate any meaningful grouping of the sample, the remaining
analysis concentrates on the two Ward techniques.

Table 4.5

provides the percentage change in agglomeration coefficients
for the two different ward techniques used in hierarchical
algorithms.
Table 4.5
ANALYSIS OF AGGLOMERATION COEFFICIENTS:
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING
Percentage Change in Agglomeration
Coefficient to Next Level
Eucledian Squared

Eucledian Distance

Number of Clusters

5.6
5.4
5.9
5.7
6.3
7.3
7.1
7.7
8.9
-

3.2
3.1
3.2
3.5
4.1
4.1
4.4
4.2
5.1
-

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
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The relative increases in the clustering coefficient for
10 to 2 clusters displayed in the first column of Table 4.5
suggest five or fewer data groupings.

The second column/ on

the other hand, indicates a lower number of groupings (2 or
possibly none).

Note that the conclusion of no grouping (or

the existence of a single group only) is consistent with the
results of average linkage models since they did not suggest
any number of data groupings, either.
al.

(1992), however,

As stated by Hair et

". . . cluster analysis, along with

factor analysis, is much more of an art than a science."

The

findings of hierarchical methods are complemented, therefore,
by a set of non-hierarchical runs to fine-tune the results.
In hierarchical

algorithms,

once an object

joins a

cluster, it is never removed and is fused with other objects
belonging to some other clusters.
combinations

may

lead

to

Thus, undesired early

artificial

results.

Unlike

hierarchical techniques, non-hierarchical techniques do not
require that the allocation of an object to a cluster be
irrevocable.

For each of the potential groupings (2 to 5)

suggested by hierarchical cluster analysis, a non-hierarchical
clustering process is run.

For the extracted groups, then, a

multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) model is applied
for all 17 statements being studied.

This application is

intended to reveal whether the mean vector for at least one
cluster is statistically significantly different from the mean
vectors of the other clusters.
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Regardless of which number of groupings between 2 to 5 is
selected, significant differences are observed among clusters.
In Table 4.6, however, only the results for the three-cluster
case is reported. Although, there is no particular reason for
reporting only the three-group clustering, this clustering is
the only one to generate a relatively equal number of cells,
which

is

an

important

requirement

for

the

subsequent

univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) to be meaningful.

As

Panel B of Table 4.6 shows, differences among the three groups
are significant with respect to statements 1-3, 5-7, 9-11, 13,
and 15-17.
The majority of the statistically significant differences
among groups, however, stems not from directly opposing views
(i.e., disagreement versus agreement), but rather from the
strength of the consensus

[i.e.,

one cluster agrees

(or

disagrees) with the statement more than other(s) measured by
the cluster means].

Specifically, as shown in Panel B of

Table 4.6, the mean values of the three groups in statements
3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 13 are either below 2 (disagree) or
above 2 (agree); that is, the direction of the opinion is the
same. For example, mean values of three clusters suggest that
they all agree with statement 3 that a private firm can sell
assets/divisions

easier

than

a

publicly

held

company.

Statistically significant difference is due to the strength of
the agreement (3.05, 2.96, and 2.10 for clusters 1, 2, and 3,
respectively), rather than to the divergence of opinions.
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Table 4.6
MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE OF THREE CLUSTERS
PANEL A: Multivariate Tests of Significance
Degrees of Freedom
Test Name

Value

F
Statistic

Between
Groups

Within
Groups

Significance
of F Statistic

Pillai 's Trace

1.229

8.643

34

184

0.0001

HotellingLawley Trace

3.210

8.498

34

180

0.0001

Wilk3' Lambda
Roy's (Sreatest
Root

0.148

8.570
9.472

34
17

182
92

0.0001
0.0001

1.750

PANEL B: Univariate F Tests
Mean Value*,b

F
Significance
Statistic of F Statistic

Statement

Whole
Sample

Cluster 1

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

1

2.22

1.86

2.61

2.28

5.15

.0071

2

2.05

2.49

2.28

1.24

14.83

.0001

3

2.73

3.05

2.96

2.10

8.77

.0003

4

1.55

1.65

1.58

1.41

0.50

.6063

5

2.59

2.84

2.78

2.08

9.32

.0002

6

2.18

1.58

2.80

2.34

12.15

.0001

7

2.26

2.03

2.68

2.14

5.61

.0048

8

3.22

3.20

3.27

3.19

0.13

.8804

9

2.52

2.66

2.81

2.05

6.04

.0033

10

2.68

3.08

2.35

2.51

9.40

.0002

11

1.71

1.72

1.94

1.46

3.12

.0483

12

1.16

1.20

1.02

1.25

0.29

.7491

13

2 . SI

2.85

2.37

2.75

4.22

.0171

14

2.79

2.70

2.83

2.88

0.39

.6765

15

2.17

1.84

1.94

2.83

8.40

.0004

16

2.53

2.81

1.91

2.80

18.02

.0001

17

1.53

1.56

2.01

1.00

7.40

.0010

(a) Whole sample mean is based on 110 observations, since in multivariate
analysis SAS does not take into account cases with missing values.
(b) The number of respondents in clusters 1, 2, and 3 are 43, 34, and 33,
respectively.
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4.3.2 LBO Group versus Reverse LBO Group

The results in the previous section clearly indicate that
managers are not homogeneous in their perceptions with respect
to all the statements involved.

In fact,

they show a

significant diversity on those statements that are directly
applicable to the undervaluation hypothesis.
Without knowing certain characteristics of the firms in
these three clusters, the conclusions drawn from the above
analyses remain somewhat limited.
addressed in

This question will be re

section 4.3.3 in the discussion of buyout

decisions in value versus glamour stocks. The present section
investigates a possible discrepancy between the following two
groups of managers' perceptions: the LBO group and the reverse
LBO group.

In the context of hypotheses 2 (of the current

chapter) and 3 (of Chapter 5), perception differences among
the managers of these two groups are particularly important.
Although hypothesis 4 (of Chapter 5) is applicable to only
reverse LBO firms (since a re-LBO firm must become a reverse
LBO firm first), hypotheses 2 and 3 make no such distinction
and simply state that the firm is bought out by managers
because of their subjective beliefs about the true value of
their firm, and that the firm will be brought to the market to
realize the gain.
Table 4.7 displays cross-tabulations of LBO and reverse
LBO groups for the 17 statements of the survey to show the
responses to each question for these two groups.

If there
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Table 4.7

CROSS TABULATION RESULTS OF 17 STATEMENTS BY LBO AND
REVERSE LBO GROUPS
Statement
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Consensus
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT
DISAGREEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENT

Whole
Sample*
26.7
19.1
54.2
37.7
19.2
43.1
18.3
11.5
70.2
55.7
14.5
29.8
13.2
18.6
68.2
34.4
11.5
54.1
27.3
15.6
57.0
5.3
5.3
89.3
22.1
13.7
64.1
13.1
16.9
70.0
46.4
32.8
20.8
72.2
5.6
22.2
6.2
20.0
73.8
10.0
13.1
76.9
29.9
16.5
53.5
13.1
20.0
66.9
53.5
18.9
27.6

LBO Groupb
30.61
20.41
48.98
44.90
14.29
40.82
18.37
10.20
71.43
57.14
20.41
22.45
18.37
20.41
61.22
29.79
12.77
57.45
31.25
16.67
52.08
4.08
6.12
89.80
26.53
10.20
63.27
12.50
18.75
68.75
46.81
27.66
25.53
71.43
8.16
20.41
10.42
20.83
68.75
12.50
14.58
72.92
27.08
14.58
58.33
14.29
24.49
61.22
53.06
12.24
34.69

Reverse
LBO Group0
24.39
18.29
57.32
33.33
22.22
44.44
18.29
12.20
69.51
54.88
10.98
34.15
10.00
17.50
72.50
37.33
10.67
52.00
25.00
15.00
60.00
6.10
4.88
89.02
19.51
15.85
64.63
13.41
15.85
70.73
46.15
35.90
17.95
72.73
3.90
23.38
3.66
19.51
76.83
8.54
12.20
79.27
31.65
17.72
50.63
12.35
17.28
70.37
53.85
23.08
23.08

X2
(p-value)
0.91
(.63)
2.18
(.34)
0.12
(.94)
3.32
(.19)
2.32
(.31)
0.75
(.69)
0.81
(.67)
0.32
(.85)
1.40
(.49)
0.19
(.91)
1.42
(.49)
1.11
(.58)
2.54
(.28)
0.77
(.68)
0.72
(.69)
1.26
(.53)
3.35
(.19)

a, b, and c reflect percentage (%) values.
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were no bias arising from the group differences, one would
expect the proportion of the survey sample agreeing with each
statement to be the same for LBO and reverse LBO firms.

Chi-

square analysis is used to test for differences in the
responses between the two groups.

These statistical tests

show that the responses of the LBO group and reverse LBO group
do

not

differ

significantly

at

conventional

levels

of

significance.
The

results

of

the

cross-frequency

tables

are

substantiated by a MANOVA to test the null hypothesis of
equality of vector means across the groups designated by
buyout stage; i.e., LBO versus reverse LBO.

Findings are

reported in Panel A of Table 4.8. Similarly, Panel B presents
the univariate ANOVA results applied to 17 statements to
detect

the

mean

difference

between

the

two

groups

of

respondents.
In line with prior expectations, the F-statistics do not
show any statistically significant differences between LBO and
reverse LBO groups. Moreover, even the direction of consensus
(i.e.,

disagreement,

neutrality,

and agreement) does not

varybetween the groups; that is, the mean values of all
statements (but statement 2) are either above or below 2 for
both groups simultaneously. It should be noted, however, that
p-value for statement 13 is 0.071.

Although this is above

0.05, it is interesting nevertheless in light of the question
and group means which are 2.78 for reverse LBOs and 2.51 for
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Table 4.8

MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE OF LBO VERSUS REVERSE LBO GROUPING
PANEL A: Multivariate Tests of Significance
Degrees of Freedom
Test Name

Value

F
Statistic

Between
Groups

Within
Groups

Significance of
F Statistic

Pillai's Trace

0.112

0.681

17

92

.8140

HotellingLawley Trace

0.126

0.681

17

92

.8140

Wilks' Lambda
Roy's Greatest
Root

0.888
0.126

0.681
0.681

17
17

92
92

.8140
.8140

PANEL B: Univariate F Tests
Mean Valuea'b
Statement

Whole
Sample

Reverse
LBO Group

LBO
Group

1

2.22

2.19

2.25

0.07

.7863

2

2.05

2.11

1.96

0.39

.5311

3

2.73

2.76

2.69

0.09

.7609

4

1.55

1.56

1.55

0.01

.9407

5

2.59

2.66

2.50

0.84

.8625

6

2.18

2.15

2.22

0.09

.7659

7

2.26

2.35

2.14

1.38

.2423

8

3.22

3.27

3.13

1.04

.3111

9

2.52

2.58

2.44

0.49

.4849

10

2.68

2.75

2.59

0.93

.3374

F
Significance of F
Statistic
Statistic

11

1.71

1.66

1.79

0.68

.4127

12

1.16

1.15

1.17

0.01

.9436

13

2.67

2.78

2.51

3.33

.0710*

14

2 .79

2.83

2.74

0.28

.5978

15

2.17

2.06

2.33

1.28

.2600

16

2.53

2.55

2.50

0.08

.7757

17

1.53

1.42

1.70

1.59

.2093

(a) Whole sample mean is based on 110 observations, since in multivariate
analysis SAS does not take into account cases with missing values.
(b) The number of respondents in reverse LBO group and LBO group are 66
and 44, respectively.
* Significant at 10% level.
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LBOs.

With this exception, the overall results suggest that

firms that reverse their LBO are not in a special class, at
least along the dimensions covered by the survey.
4.3.3 Buyout Decisions in Value versus Glamour Stocks

Despite its history in finance and security analysis, marketto-book value of equity, MV/BV, has become popular only
recently following Fama and French (1992).7

They conclude

that stock returns can be explained by two measures that do
not incorporate beta: size and MV/BV, the latter having the
largest effect.

This conclusion is not limited to markets in

the United States,

but applies also to those of Japan,

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland [see
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991; and Capaul, Rowley, and
Sharpe, 1993].
Apart

from its apparent role in empirical studies,

however, MV/BV lacks a consensus as a satisfactory economic
explanation.

Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993) introduce

MV/BV as the variable that differentiates value and growth
stocks. Favorable growth prospects raise a firm's stock price
and, therefore, induce a high MV/BV ratio.

Similarly, a low

MV/BV is likely to be associated with high asset value and
less

growth

potential.

A

second

view

capitalizes

on

mispricing by the market and suggests that a low (high) MV/BV
characterizes undervalued (overvalued) stocks.
Lehn and Poulsen (1988) observe that buyouts are most
likely to occur in mature industries with stable cash flows
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but limited growth opportunities.

Retail, textiles, food,

apparel, and bottled and canned soft drinks are the five
categories of industries that collectively contain 46.2% of
the firms that account for 46.8% of the value of the 106 LBOs
included in their sample.

Studies by Maupin, Bidwell, and

Ortegren (1984), Kieschnik (1989), and Lehn and Poulsen (1989)
all

support

the

notion

that

targets

of

going-private

transactions are characterized by lower growth rates (in sales
and employment) and lower market-to-book ratios than other
firms in the same industry.

These facts, coupled with the

discussion above, suggest that investigating differences in
managers' attitudes across firms grouped by market-to-book
value

(MV/BV)

may

provide

additional

insights

into

the

analysis.
The ratio for each firm is measured for the accounting
year immediately preceding the buyout announcement rather than
for

the

present

time.

This

is

because

respondents,

presumably, have evaluated the survey statements in the light
of the going-private decision, which must be associated (if
related at all) with market-to-book value of the equity at the
time of the buyout.

Following Fama and French (1992), the

book value of common equity is proxied by Compustat data item
60.

Market value of the common equity is calculated by using

the closing share price and the number of shares outstanding
as of December.
the

accounting

Only for 58 firms is data available at both
and

market

level

in

CRSP,

Compustat,
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Lexis/Nexis, Moody's, and S&P Stock Reporter.8

The lack of

data for the remaining 73 firms is mainly due to the fact that
they are divisional MBOs.

The inclusion of such buyouts in

the main sample of the study was unavoidable since they are
the major contributor to the reverse LBO sample, and hence, to
the re-LBO sample as well, which are direct interests of the
study.

The cut-off value for grouping the firms is the median

MV/BV of these 58 firms, 1.1549.

The main impetus for using

the median value was to obtain groups with an equal number of
observations. The following table presents summary statistics
on market value of equity, book value of equity, and MV/BV
ratio.
Table 4.9
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET-BASED MEASURES
FOR 58 MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
Mean

Median

Maximum

21,830.0

629,854.9

259,273.0

6,183,000.0

Market Value of
Equity ($000)

3,916.0

328,673.2

155,705.4

2,563,953.0

Book Value of
Equity ($000)

8,337.0

258,381.5

118,015.5

1,946,000.0

0.3901

1.3018

1.1549

3.7862

Measure

Minimum

Book Value of
Assets ($000)

Ratio of
MV/BV of Equity

The F-values for various statistics testing the equality
of mean vectors for two groups are too low to be considered
significant
significance.
three

at

the

conventional

levels

of

statistical

Examined at the individual level, however,

statements

are

found

to

generate

statistically
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significant differences between group opinions.

Table 4.10

shows the results for these statements only.
Table 4.10
SUMMARY TABLE OF LOW MV/BV VERSUS HIGH MV/BV GROUPS

Univariate F Tests
Mean Value*
Statement

Whole Sample

Low
MV/BV Group

High
MV/BV Group

P Statistic

4

1.56

1.6966

1.2586

2.63*

10

2.68

2.7862

2.3690

3.71**

13

2.68

2.8828

2.4207

5.89***

(a) Whole sample mean values are taken from Table 4.1, and they are based
on 131 respondents' opinions. Number of observations in two groups
are 29 as the median value of the MV/BV ratio (1.1549) is used as the
cutoff point for grouping.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Both groups disagree with statement 4 and agree with
statements 10 and 13.

Note that the strength of the opinion,

measured by the group mean values, for all three statements is
higher for the low MV/BV group.

These results may suggest

that the managers of low MV/BV firms have a stronger view
regarding their firms' value being more as parts rather than
the whole than do the managers of high MV/BV group.

The low

MV/BV group also seems less inclined than the high MV/BV group
to use an outside consultant and are more willing to go public
again following the buyout.
4.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusions
The last two decades have witnessed various restructuring
activities of many American corporations.

Among these, most

companies took the path from public to private.

Even before
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a consensus has been reached among academicians on the motives
for such a move, however, some of these companies returned to
public trading.

This study surveys financial managers of

publicly

or

traded

private

firms

that

experienced

a

management-led leveraged buyout after 1980 to determine their
perception of going-private transactions in general, and to
investigate the undervaluation/information asymmetry motive of
buyouts in particular.
The

analyses

questionnaires

that

suggest

were
several

applied

to

131

conclusions.

completed
First,

the

results show that managers do not view the participation of
the buyout specialist as a major determinant of a buyout's
success.

This finding is at variance with previous empirical

evidence that buyout specialists are one of the driving forces
behind improved efficiency following the buyouts.
Second, contrary to previous evidence that buyout targets
experience a profit decline in the year preceding the buyout,
the respondents

seem to believe

that their company was

performing better than their industry peers before the buyout.
This suggests that such an opinion is formed mainly by their
subjective beliefs or private information rather than the
stock market, or accounting, or other publicly available
financial measures.
Finally, the majority of financial executives think that
the target firm as a whole is less valuable than the sum of
its parts and that its stock is undervalued in the pre-buyout
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period.

Although

these

opinions

of

executives

show

discrepancy among groups formed by principal components and
cluster analysis, the differences stem from the strength of
opinions rather than from divergence of opinions among groups.
More importantly, with the exception of statement 13, no
significant differences are observed between the views of LBO
and reverse LBO groups.
Of course, these conclusions must be evaluated within the
limiting aspects of survey research.

Non-response bias, for

example, is a problem common to all survey studies including
the present one.

Another drawback is the fact that CFOs are

not the only individuals involved in the buyout decision.
Last, and most important, the possibility that the respondent
might be a totally irrelevant individual exposes this type of
study to criticism.
both

the

last

It is very encouraging (with respect to

statement

and

the

information

asymmetry

hypothesis), however, that the president of a company (names
withheld for confidentiality reasons) expresses his opinions
in an attached letter as follows:
In general, I believe these (management-led buyouts) occur
when the stock of the business, or a segment of the business,
is undervalued and management believes it can accomplish two
goals:
(1) To preserve the integrity and to grow the
business, and,
(2) for management to make a large return on
their investment of cash or personal risk.

4.5

Notes to Chapter 4

1.

Maupin, Bidwell, and Ortegren (1984) find that the stocks
of going- private firms are traded at relatively large
discounts from book value (compared to a control sample
of firms matched on the basis of similar industry and
asset size) before the buyout. Kieschnick (1989) reports
a lower stock return for the going-private firms than
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that for a sample of public firms in the year up to the
quarter before the buyout.
Similar inferences are
attained based on the analysis of various accounting/
financial ratios. For example, Wu (1992) documents that
the average industry-adjusted change in operating income
(standardized by the market value of the firm in the year
preceding the buyout) of buyout firms is negative and
statistically significant in the year before the buyout.
2.

One can argue that agreeing with the statement may mean,
on the managers' side, admitting they are incompetent.
Magowan's (1989) statement (as well as previous studies
in the literature) runs counter to this view:
, with KKR'a help, we were able to figure it
out for ourselves. . . . There
were a couple of very specialized tax areas where it was
necessary to get some extra opinions-we have never been
through that kind of thing before. KKR was very helpful
to us in arranging the financing and helping with the
asset sales, but they basically let the operation of the
company to us."
( w h a t n e e d e d to b e d o n e )

(Magowan was CEO of Safeway Stores and a member of the
management team involved in the buyout.)
3.

The role of buyout specialists in efficiency gains is
generally attributed to both their experience in buyout
deals and their substantial equity stake in the new firm.
The latter gives them not only a definite incentive to
closely monitor managers, but also often the ability to
fire incapable ones. See Shleifer and Vishny (1988),
Baker and Wruck (1989), and Denis (1994), for example,
for the role of buyout specialists in improving the
efficiency in private organizations.

4.

Names, titles, and addresses are identified from various
business information sources of U.S. public and private
companies: disclosure data, Standard & Poor's Register,
Ward's Business Directory, and Million Dollar Directory.

5.

The choice of 0.63 as a cutoff score in the interpreta
tion is purely arbitrary. It is justified, however, by
the observation that there is a noticeable distance
between 0.63 and communalities below it (as opposed to
those above it).

6.

Although not reported, various orthogonal rotation
methods including quartimax, equamax, and oblimin
rotations also provide similar results where the same
statements load significantly on the same factors.
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7.

Although recent literature tends to use book-to-market
value of the equity, market-to-book value of the equity
is used in this dissertation.

8.

Same sample of firms should be used in a follow-up study
to both objectively evaluate statement 15 and identify
characteristics of the firms in the three groups generat
ed by the factor analysis/clustering approach.
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Chapter 5
U N D E R V A L U A T I O N A S A N I N C E N T I V E F O R LBOst
HYPOTHESES TESTS USING M A R K E T D A T A

5.1 Introduction

This chapter tests the information asymmetry hypothesis using
market data.

Based on the comparison of a sample of 21 re-LBO

firms with a control sample, Chapter 3 concludes that the
motive for an LBO is not necessarily related to the free cash
flow hypothesis.

The findings presented in Chapter 4 suggest

that LBOs may be a tool used by management to exploit its
information advantage.

Without additional evidence, however,

it is difficult,

make a strong statement about the

to

information asymmetry hypothesis of buyouts.

This chapter

fills the gap, vis-d-vis a sample of 104 reverse LBO firms.
Chapter 5 compares the value gain realized by these
reverse LBO firms with that realized by a control sample of
firms.

It also studies the sharing of wealth between pre

buyout shareholders and managers (who initiate the buyout).
Although these two points constitute the core of the chapter,
additional hypotheses are also proposed and tested in order to
clarify whether management does use buyouts as a tool to
exploit its information advantage.
The industry hypothesis presented in this chapter studies
value gains in reverse LBOs across industries to discover
whether the clustering of LBOs in certain industries has
anything to do with information asymmetry between managers and
105
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shareholders.

The learning-curve hypothesis predicts that

only successful first-round (public to private to public)
managers repeat the LBO.

The last hypothesis of the chapter

completes the learning-curve concept (from the point of view
of the shareholders this time) by comparing the percentage
premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders in the first and
second buyouts.

The buyout percentage premium must be larger

in the second buyout than in the first if shareholders are
fooled (because of their informational disadvantage) in the
first buyout (and hence require more in the second LBO).
5.2 Reverse LBO Sample Characteristics
From an initial sample of 450 reverse LBO firms, 104 firms are
selected.1

The buyout values for these 104 firms are the

completion values of LBO deals as reported in the media (i.e.,
Going

Public-The

IPO

Reporter,

Mergers

& Acquisitions,

Mergerstat Review, The Yearbook on Corporate Mergers, Joint
Ventures and Corporate Policy).

The remaining firms are

eliminated for the following reasons either the buyout value
is not disclosed to the public, or it is not available in any
of the sources searched.

It is possible to use the market

value of the firm at its last trading date as a proxy for the
buyout value.

This approach does not provide a great deal of

help in the present case, however, because the subject reverse
LBO firms are mainly divisions of other companies and hence do
not have price or share data available.
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The descriptive statistics

in Table 5.1 detail the

distribution of 104 LBOs undertaken during the period 1980 to
1993. The first column presents the year of the going-private
transaction.

Column 2 shows the number of LBOs corresponding

to each year.

As shown, 1988 not only has the largest number

of LBOs (26), but also includes several large LBOs.

In fact,

1988 LBOs account for the largest portion (36%) of total
buyout value during the 1980-1993 period.

Full sample values

are given in the last row of the table.
Table 5.1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR REVERSE LBO FIRMS,
GROUPED BY LBO YEAR
Buyout Value
(Millions of Dollars)
Year

Number
of LBOs

Mean

Median

1980

1

195.000

195.000

195.000

1981

4

74.375

107.500

297.500

1982

2

44.100

44.100

88.200

1983

4

93.125

46.250

372.500

1984

10

134.110

76.000

1,341.100

1985

10

158.800

77.500

1,588.000

1986

18

105.544

79.500

1,899.800

1987

5

174.320

131.000

871.600

1988

26

251.659

155.000

6,543.140

1989

10

227.717

265.000

2,277.170

1990

6

168.417

140.000

1,010.500

1991

4

37.900

36.000

151.600

1992

3

504.633

92.500

1,513.900

1993

1

4.100

4.100

4.100

100.000

18,154.110

Full
Sample

104

174.56

Total
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The sample average at the time of the buyout is $174.56
million, and the median is $100 million.

Minimum and maximum

values are $4.10 million and $1.80 billion, respectively. The
average period that the sample firms were under private
ownership is 36.01 months (median is equal to 32.22), which is
only slightly higher than the 34.2 months (median is equal to
29) reported by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990). That is, on
average, LBO firms return to public trading within three years
of the buyout.
Table 5.2 provides additional characteristics of reverse
LBO firms, for their reversal (i.e., going public) year.

The

third column gives the average value of the firms (measured as
the market price at the end of the offer day x the number of
shares outstanding in the firm) at the time of the public
offering.

Column 4 shows the dollar amount offered in the

public offering.

The last column is the ratio of column 3 to

column 4; i.e., the percentage of the firm value offered.
The peak year for the reverse LBO was 1987, in which
there were 21 public offerings of reverse LBO firms.

Full

sample results show that, on average, 32.94% of the firm is
offered to the public.

Although one firm in the sample

offered 83.14% of its value to the public, a mean 32.94% offer
value suggests that management, at least in the initial public
offering, maintains its concentrated ownership in the reverse
LBO firm.
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Table 5.2

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR REVERSE LBO FIRMS,
GROUPED BY GOING-PUBLIC TEAR
Average Value
(Millions of Dollars)
Year

Number of
Reverse LBOs

Firm Value
at the Offer

Total Amount
Offered

1983

1

103.062

30.000

Offer Ratio
(%)
29.11

1984

2

83.548

29.300

34.79

1985

2

22.211

5.584

25.25

1986

13

147.153

43.420

29.34

1987

21

158.917

46.269

32.58

1988

4

85.082

30.643

34.66

1989

1

150.564

47.850

31.78

1990

1

97.500

46.750

47.95

1991

17

444.645

104.119

30.98

1992

17

291.415

96.913

35.51

1993

18

256.581

70.722

35.47

1994

5

369.757

66.200

28.67

1995

2

217.919

92.080

41.25

104

245.859

68.234

32.94

Full
Sample

5.3 The Profit Motive in the Reverse LBO (H,)

Under

the

hypothesis

of

a

semi-strong

informationally

efficient market, it is reasonable to assume that pre-buyout
shareholders

require

a premium

containing

not

only

the

potential tax benefits (likely to accrue to the post-buyout
firm), but also the tax costs associated with capital gains
through the sale of shares.

Under the same reasoning, gains

created via reduction of agency

costs and reduction of

transaction costs must also be accounted for in the premium.
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Therefore, gains accruing to the buyout investors come from
the value hidden in the firm (which translates into value
creation after the buyout).
in

the reverse LBO,

management,

having

achieved

a

substantial paper gain in the value of the firm's equity
because of significantly increased cash flows,
company back to the public.

sells the

In addition to reducing the

financial risk of the firm by lowering the leverage, reversing
the LBO through the issuance of stock allows buyout investors,
particularly managers, to reduce their personal risk through
portfolio diversification. This action, which constitutes the
first stage of the reversal, is undertaken within a relatively
short period of the initial buyout.
Hypothesis 3:

Management's motivation in an LBO is

to realize a profit by taking the company public
again.
Given that the free cash flow hypothesis (Hi) is not a
general explanation to going-private transactions, H3 intends
to show that the LBO is a tool for management to exploit its
information privilege.

That is, managers buy out the company

when they think it is undervalued and can thus profit from the
process.
5.3.1 Implications of H3
H3 is tested by comparing the increased value of the firm
under private ownership with the possible added value had it
remained public.

H3 is broken down into two sub-hypothesess
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(a)
moderate
temporary

The

ignored value hypothesis, which

information
ignorance

asymmetry
by

the

problem

market.

and
A

assumes

a

suggests

a

statistically

insignificant difference between the two measures (value gain
under private ownership versus value gain in public form) is
likely to support the ignored value hypothesis, suggesting
that improvements in buyout firms would have happened anyway
(with or without a buyout).
(b) The hidden value hypothesis, which implies a severe
information asymmetry problem.

That is, the information

asymmetry problem is persistent and is not conveyed by another
means of transmittal to the market.
The hidden value hypothesis is consistent with H2 in that
the motivation behind the buyout is management's subjective
belief that the firm's value can be increased significantly.
Hence, it predicts a lower value for the firm had it remained
public

rather than gone through a reverse LBO process.

Therefore, a statistically significant increment in the value
of reverse LBO firms, compared with that of control sample
firms, supports the buyout investors' superior information,
which

is

reflected

in

investment,

production,

and

organizational activities in LBO firms.
5.3.2 A Discussion of the Proxy Variable
The test of H3 requires both a reasonable measure of the
incremental value of firms (reverse LBOs and control firms)
and the construction of a meaningful control sample. By their
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nature, reverse

LBOs

performance measure:

allow

one

to use

a

market value of equity.

market-based
Figure 5.1

shows how time is measured and the dates of interest in the
analyses that follow.

---!
------ j
------ ,
---T1

T2

T3

LBO PROPOSAL

LBO COMPLETED

PUBLIC OFFERING

Figure 5.1
TIME TABLE OF A REVERSE LBO

The value gain for a reverse LBO firm is calculated as the
difference between re-entry value and buyout value,
VG = REV - BOV .

(1)

Buyout value is the dollar amount reported (in any of the
sources

mentioned

completion (T2).

on

p.

106)

at

the time

of

the

LBO

Re-entry value is measured at the time of

the firm's IPO (T3) as follows:
REV = N x p ,

(2)

where N is the number of shares outstanding after the public
offering and P is the stock price at the end of the first
trading day.
The systematic underpricing of equity IPOs is a welldocumented

empirical

phenomenon.

Consistent with

this,

Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) report a 1.70% mean return
for their full (meaning not divisional) reverse LBO sample at
the end of the offering day.

Although the 1.70% mean return
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is neither statistically nor economically significant (and is
well below the corresponding number of about 8% for their
control sample), not accounting for this return in the present
study may cause downward bias in the estimate of the re-entry
value.
5.3.3 The Control Sample
As stated above, one way of estimating the change in the value
of the firm, as if it were a public company, is to contrast it
to a control sample.
have

characteristics

Such a sample must contain firms that
similar

to

the

buyout

company's.

Following earlier studies of LBOs, industry category and size
of the firm are used in this study to construct the control
sample.
Also

consistent

with

previous

studies,

classification is based on a four-digit SIC code.

industry
Size is

proxied by total market value of equity (stock price x number
of shares outstanding) at the time of the LBO completion of
the buyout company (T2).

Similarly, the calculation of the

increment in the market value of a firm in the control sample
is simply the difference between the market values of the
firm's equities at T3 and T2. A comparison of the LBO sample
with the control sample should then measure the performance of
the re-entering LBOs

relative to their

possible

public

performance.
Table 5.3 compares the mean buyout value of the reverse
LBO sample with the market value (measured at the time of the
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matching LBO firm's buyout transaction) of the control sample.
The third column reports the mean difference in the value of
this variable for each matched pair of reverse LBO firm and
corresponding

control

firm.

The

last

column

has

the

associated t-statistic for a difference in means test.
Table 5.3
MEAN REVERSE LBO BUYOUT VALUE
AND MEAN CONTROL FIRM MARKET VALUE
Reverse
LBO Firms
(Million $)

Control Firms
(Million $)

Mean Difference
(Million $)

t-statistic*
(p-value)

174.558

182.114

-7.556

-0.8224
(0.4127)

(a) The F-statistic based on the ratio of variances of the two groups of
firms is 1.12. This result indicates that the null hypothesis of
equal variances cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signi
ficance and that the use of a t-test is appropriate.

As expected, the mean difference is not significant since
the market value at the time of the buyout is one of the
criteria used to create the control sample.
that mean difference is -$7.56 million

Note, however,
(an economically

significant dollar amount), indicating that matching is not
perfect and that the value of control firms at the time of the
buyout, on average, are greater than those of the reverse
LBOs.

Although not statistically significant, this finding

suggests that some adjustment to the VG variable might be
necessary to remove any potential bias because of differences
between the values of reverse LBOs and control firms at the
time of the buyout.

The use of return on investment (ROI) is

intended to take care of this problem and is defined as
follows:
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ROI = VG / BOV

(3)

It is the ROI that will be used in the following hypothesis
test.

If the ROI in the reverse LBO firms is greater than

the ROI in the control firms, then one can conclude that
management exploits the gain from undervaluation of the LBO
firm.
5.3.4 Empirical Test of H,
A difference in means test for matched samples is used to
test h 3. Panel A of Table 5.4 presents the findings of this
test.

As expected, the mean ROI of the reverse LBO sample

is greater than that of the control sample (the mean of the
difference is positive, 0.724).

The associated t-statistic

value, however, is 1.015, which suggests that the difference
is not statistically different from zero.

Note that this

finding is in line with the prediction of the ignored value
hypothesis (discussed in Section 5.3.1 above), but clearly
fails to support the hidden value hypothesis.
improvements

That is,

in buyout firms would have happened anyway

(with or without a buyout).
An alternative test of H3 is to compare the difference
between the pre-LBO firm values and the going-public firm
values for the reverse LBO firms.

Note that this is in fact

the VG variable defined in section above.

The results for

this variable are given in Panel B of Table 5.4.

The mean

increase in value is $71,300 million and is significant at the
1% level.

Although it is discouraging not to obtain similar
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support from the use of the ROI variable, this last finding
provides some support for the hypothesis that LBOs are driven
by the undervaluation of firms.

That is, managers do make a

significant profit by taking a firm private and then bringing
it public again.
Table 5.4
PERFORMANCE TESTS FOR THE REVERSE LBO FIRMS
Panel A:

M e a n V a l u e s o f BOX f o r R e v e r s e L B O and C o n t r o l F i r m s
C o r r e s p o n d i n g t-st a t i s t i c for D i f f e r e n c e in M e a n s Test

Variable
ROI*
Panel B:

and

Reverse LBO
Firms

Control
Firms

Mean
Difference

t-statisticb
(p-value)

1.505

0.781

0.724

1.0150
(0.3129)

Mean Value Increase for Reverse LBO Firms and Corresponding
t - s t a t i s t i c f o r D i f f e r e n c e in M e a n s T e s t

Buyout Value

Second
IPO Value

Mean
Difference

t-statistic®
(p-value)

174.559

245.8590

71.3000

4.3670
(0.0001)

(a) ROI is defined as Incremental Value/Initial Value.
(b,c) The F-statistic based on the ratio of the variances of the two
groups of firms rejects the null hypothesis of equal variances at
a significance level of 1%. However, the use of a t-test is still
appropriate for both cases since group sizes are equal (Anderson,
Sweeney, and Williams, pg. 345).

5.3.5 An Extension of H3: Industry Hypothesis
An extension of H3 is to examine the value gains across
industries.

This is because LBOs, like repurchases, tend to

cluster by industry, as reported by Lehn and Poulsen (1988)
and Kieschnik (1989).

In Lehn and Poulsen (1988), the retail,

textiles, food, apparel, and bottled and canned soft drinks
industries represent 46.2% of the firms that account for 46.8%
of the value of 106 leveraged buyouts included in their
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sample.

The top four industries in the Kieschnik (1989)

sample of 102 buyouts are apparel products, food products,
textile

products,

and

transport

equipment.

Although

similarities between the two studies may be due to the overlap
in the periods covered (Lehn and Poulsen: 1980-1984; and
Kieschnik: 1981-1986), there is an apparent concentration of
LBOs in certain industries.
is the explanation

If the undervaluation hypothesis

for LBOs,

then one might

generalize

(coupled with the observed industry clustering) to industry
and expect to see significantly higher value gains for the
industry with the highest frequency of buyouts.
5.3.6 Empirical Test of Industry Hypothesis
Table 5.5 presents the number of reverse LBO sample firms by
industry.

Sample firms are distributed in 34 industries

classified by the first two digits of their SIC code.

This

rather wide industrial distribution of reverse LBOs, however,
does not prevent

some clustering in certain

industries.

Chemicals, food stores, and electric machinery are the top
three industries in which reverse LBOs are observed most
frequently. Note that this finding differs from that of
Kieschnik (1989) (where apparel products, food products, and
textile products are the leading industries) and that of Lehn
and Poulsen (1988) (where retail, textiles, and food are the
three industries with the greatest frequencies of LBOs).
Although food products or miscellaneous retail industries are
not among the top three industries in the present sample,
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they, consistent with Lehn and Poulsen's (1988) reporting,
experience a relatively high number of reverse LBOs (i.e.,
five each).
Table 5.5
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF 104 REVERSE LBO FIRMS
SIC Code
13
15
20
21
22
23
24
25
27
28
30
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
42
45
50
51
52
53
54
56
57
58
59
62
63
73
75
80
87

Industry Description
Oil and Gas Extraction
Building Construction
Food Products
Tobacco Products
Textile Products
Apparel Products
Lumber and Wood Products
Furniture and Fixtures
Paper Products
Chemicals
Rubber & Plastic Products
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Nonelectrical Machinery
Electric Machinery
Transportation Equipment
Measuring and Photo Equipment
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Motor Freight
Transportation by Air
Durable Goods: Wholesale
Nondurable Goods: Wholesale
Bldg. Matl, Hardwr, Garden: Retail
General Merchandise Stores
Food Stores
Apparel and Accessory Stores
Home Furniture 6 Equipment Stores
Eating and Drinking Places
Miscellaneous Retail
Securities Brokerage
Insurance
Business Services
Auto Repair, Services, Parking
Health Services
Engr., Acct., Resch., Mgmt. Svcs.
Total

Number
of Firms
1
2
5
1
1
2
5
1
4
8
2
5
5
5
6
3
3
4
1
1
3
1
1
1
7
1
2
2
5
1
5
2
1
5
2
104

Buyout Value
(Million $)
150.00
95.00
513.90
137.00
105.00
111.00
443.20
56.00
271.70
1,594.94
56.30
1,412.61
395.90
1,406.00
2,293.35
150.00
480.50
408.00
313.00
61.50
546.40
21.00
40.50
100.00
1,225.43
430.00
727.80
50.63
602.20
275.00
2810.10
62.00
205.00
438.55
164.60
18,154.11
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In testing the industry hypothesis,

the difference

between the mean value gain of eight firms in the chemicals
industry and the mean value gain of 12 firms each belonging to
a separate industry (collective) is compared.

The total

buyout value for the firms in the chemicals industry is $1,595
million,

compared with $1,894 million

collective group.

for firms in the

The two groups account for 19.22% of the

total buyout value of the 104 reverse LBOs.
5.3.7 Results and Discussion
Table 5.6 presents the mean values for these two groups for
two performance measures: value gain (VG), and return on
investment (ROI).
variable

The difference in means test for the ROI

produces

a

t-statistic

of

3.437,

statistically significant at the 1% level.
hypothesis

that

the mean return

on

which

is

That is, the null

investment

for the

collective industry group is equal to that for the chemical
industry group is rejected.
for the variable value gain.

The same conclusion is reached
The associated t-statistic in

this case is significant at the 5.11% level.

These results

are consistent with the industry hypothesis.

That is, firms

in the highest frequency of reverse LBO groups do obtain both
a greater dollar value increase and a greater return than
firms in industries with the least frequency of buyouts. This
finding, combined with the results of H3, provides further
support to the undervaluation motive of LBOs.2
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Table 5.6

MEAN VALUES OF PERFORMANCE VARIABLES:
AN INDUSTRIAL COMPARISON
Variable
Value Gain*
(Million $)
Return on”
Investment

Collective
Industry

Mean
Difference

237.799

42.815

194.984

1.722’*
(0.0511)

6.948

0.363

6.585

3.437'
(0.0014)

Chemicals
Industry

t-statistic
(p-value)

(a) Value gain for a firm is the difference between the going-public
value and the going-private value.
(b) Return on investment is the value gain divided by the goingprivate value.
* and ** indicate 1% and 10% level of significance, respectively,
for a one tailed t-test.

5.4 Application of Learning Curve Concept to LBOs

The progression of LBO, second initial public offering (SIPO),
and re-LBO implies that managers take the firm private when
they think it is undervalued and bring it back to the market
when they believe they can attain a higher market value.
Managers, having experienced the public-to-private/ privateto-public cycle, are likely to perform better in the second
round (i.e., second LBO and its reversal).

This proposition

is consistent with the well-known concept of the learning
curve.
Regardless of its form, the learning-curve is based on
the simple logic of "learning-by-doing," as Alchian (1950)
views it, and refers to the efficiency gained by repeating a
task (Devinney, 1987).

This efficiency, in turn, justifies

payment of a higher premium to pre-buyout shareholders.

Even

in the absence of a "learning" pattern by management, it is
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likely that the percentage premium required by rational pre
buyout investors will be larger than the first case, ceteris
paribus.

This statement rests on the assumption that the

gains of target equity holders are dwarfed by those of
managers in the first buyout;

hence, market participants

adjust their expectations upward at the second buyout.

This

discussion leads to the formulation of hypotheses 4, 5 and 6.
5.4.1 The Learning Curve Hypothesis (H4)
H4 is an intuitive extension of the Hzand H3. It posits that,
if the whole process is successful in the sense that the
returns realized by buyout investors are sufficient to cover
both the premium paid and their time/effort, then the buyout
will be exercised a second time.
Hypothesis

4:

First-round

successful

managers

(public to private to public) will repeat publicto-private transactions.
H4 is tested using reverse and re-LBO data.

The better

performance of re-LBO firms in the public-to-private/privateto-public process, compared with that of reverse LBO firms
(i.e., firms that stay as public companies after their return
to the capital markets), will support H4.
5.4.2 Empirical Findings and Discussion of H4
As in H3, the test of this hypothesis is based on the fact
that both reverse LBO and re-LBO firms possess market-based
information both on and subsequent to the IPO date.

The test

of H4 compares the value gain of repeating reverse LBO firms
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(i.e., re-LBOs) with that of non-repeating (i.e., those firms
that stay in the market and do not undertake a second buyout)
reverse LBO firms that performed better than their matched
firms

in the control firms

in terms of value creation.

According to this design, then, one should find that, to
support H4, repeating LBOs must have a significantly higher
mean value for the VG variable than the new sub-sample
created.
The above sub-sampling process yielded 43 reverse LBO
firms.

The size of the corresponding sample of re-LBOs is 11.

Ten (out of 21 used in Chapter 3) re-LBO firms are lost
because of the lack of information about their first buyout.
In the test that follows this difference in sample sizes is
taken into account explicitly.
The

findings

reported

repeating reverse LBO firms

in

Table

5.7

indicate

that

(re-LBOs) do not necessarily

perform better than the non-repeating reverse LBO firms in
terms of value creation in their first turnaround (i.e.,
public-to-private/private-to-public).

Assuming

that

the

performance measure, comparison group, and statistical test
used are appropriate, H4 cannot be supported.

This result may

suggest that the motive for the second LBO is not necessarily
a successful first round, but the desire to increase the value
of the firm toward a perceived value that management thinks
that it was not achieved in the first attempt.
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Table 5.7

COMPARISON OF VALUE GAINS FOR Re-LBOs AND
SUCCESSFUL REVERSE LBO FIRMS
Re-LBO
Firms

Variable

Successful
Reverse LBOs

Mew
Difference

t-statistic*

164.910
142.175
22.735
0.263
Value Gain6
(Million $)
(a) The F-statistic based on the ratio of the variances of the two
groups of firms is 3.33, and hence, the null hypothesis of equal
variances is rejected at a 1% level of significance. Accordingly,
the t-test should be interpreted with caution.
(b) Value gain for a firm is the difference between the going-public
value and the going-private value.

5.4.3 The Sharing of Health Between Pre- and Post-Buyout
Shareholders (H5)

Hypothesis 5: Post-buyout equity investors earn
more than pre-buyout (target) shareholders in the
first buyout.
H; is a test of whether the returns realized by buyout
investors (managers) are significantly higher than premiums
paid to pre-buyout shareholders.
tested using reverse LBO data.
percentage premiums

This hypothesis is also
A comparison between the

paid to pre-buyout

shareholders

management's return should capture this difference.
cannot

be

rejected,

then

it

might

be

and
If H5

concluded

that

shareholders (market participants) are fooled in the first LBO
because of their information disadvantage (implying that the
market may not be strong-form efficient).
In order to mitigate the impact of a possible information
leak on the stock price, the premium paid to target equity
holders is measured relative to the stock price two months
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before the buyout announcement.

The final input needed to

calculate the percentage premium is the final offer price.
This is the buyout price defined as the per-share cash payment
received by pre-buyout shareholders. The premium paid to pre
buyout shareholders,

then, is calculated as the fraction

difference between the buyout equity price (at T2 in Figure 1)
and the price of equity two months before the buyout proposal
(Tl-2ms.):
PP = (PriceT2 - PriceT1.2aaJ + PriceTi_jM..

(4)

5.4.4 Empirical Findings and Discussion of H,
Compared with the test of H4, where there was a serious
sample size problem,

the test of Hs uses 32 reverse LBO

cases for which market data are available for the period
prior to their first buyout.

This information is particular

ly important since the premiums paid in these transactions
cannot be otherwise calculated.
The average private life for this subsample of reverse
LBO firms is 48.45 months (median=44.76).
number

is

somewhat

larger

than

(mean=36.01 and median=32.22).

the

Note that this

full

sample

value

Since the remaining cases in

the full sample are mostly divisional buyouts, this finding
suggests that divisional management buyouts return to the
public

faster.

Perhaps

the

speed

of

the

public-to-

private/private-to-public process may be a better indication
of the information advantage of insiders — a point that may be
worth studying separately.
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The average time that elapses between the buyout proposal
announcement and completion of the buyout transaction for
these firms is eight months (median-five months).

This time

difference suggests that both return measures (management's
and shareholders')

must somehow be adjusted in order to

provide a meaningful comparison.

In Table 5.8, therefore,

both management's and shareholders' average monthly returns
are reported.

The mean difference between these two matched

groups is given in column 4. Column 5 presents the associated
t-statistic (p-value is in parentheses).
Table 5.8
COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT'S RETURN AND SHAREHOLDERS' RETURN
IN REVERSE LBO TRANSACTIONS
Variable
Monthly Return

Management
0.092046

Pre-Buyout
Shareholders
0.04740

Mean
Difference
0.045863

t-statistic
(p-value)
0.630
(0.533)

As expected, the sign of the mean difference between
management's and pre-buyout shareholders' returns is positive.
This difference, however, is not statistically significant.
This result, combined with the findings for H« and the mixed
results

presented

in

Section

5.3,

casts

doubt

on

the

information asymmetry hypothesis of LBOs.
5.4.5 Premiums Paid -bo Pre-Buyout Shareholders in the First
and the Second Buyout (Hs)
Hypothesis 6: In re-LBO transactions, the percent
age premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders in the
first buyout is lower than that paid in the second
buyout.
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A comparison of the percentage premiums paid to prebuyout shareholders in the first and second buyout can be used
to test the learning pattern by management.

This comparison

may also provide additional evidence on the information
asymmetry hypothesis.

Both learning by management and the

revised expectations of shareholders (market participants),
whose returns are dwarfed by managers' in the first cycle,
justify the payment of a higher percentage premium in the
second round.

This argument (managers gain more than the

shareholders) is not empirically supported in the previous
section.
Next, the average prediction errors of the second buyout
announcement of

re-LBO

firms

are

compared with

average

prediction errors of a randomly selected group of LBO firms.3
Though this process is not a perfect way to test Hs, it is
worthwhile to examine the comparison of excess returns for the
two groups of firms.
5.4.6 Empirical Findings and Discussion of He

The conventional market model event
Chapter 3 (pp. 42-43)

study introduced in

is used to calculate the average

prediction errors for two buyout samples.

As before, the

estimation period is -170 to -21 relative to the announcement
day.

Table 5.9 presents the cumulative prediction errors of

each group and their mean differences for the event window
[-20,+20] (i.e., days -20 through +20).

Both types of buyouts

provide significant cumulative average prediction errors.
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Traditional t-statistics testing the null hypothesis of zero
average prediction errors are 7.15 for the re-LBO group and
4.72 for the randomly selected LBO group. The CAPEs generated
by second LBO announcements are noticeably higher (a mean
difference of 19.72%) than the ones created by the first LBO
announcement.
t-statistic

Moreover, this difference is associated with a
value

of

14.177,

which

is

statistically

significant at the 1% level.
Table 5.9
COMPARISON OF [-20 ,+20] WINDOW CAPES
FOR FIRST AND SECOND LBO ANNOUNCEMENTS
Second LBO
Announcements

First LBO
Announcements

Mean
Difference

t-statistic

37.151

17.431

19.72

14.177*

CAPE (%)

* Significant at 1% level.

At

present,

it

is difficult

to find

a reasonable

explanation for such a huge difference between the two types
of buyouts. However, the significantly higher market reaction
to the re-LBO announcements may suggest that re-LBOs warrant
further investigation.

This,

unfortunately, cannot occur

until additional re-LBOs take place and a larger sample
becomes available.
5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter

examines

the

information advantage

of

the

management team in going-private transactions. Its purpose is
to test a set of hypotheses (not mutually exclusive) that, one
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way or another, investigate the information asymmetry (or
undervaluation) explanation of LBOs.
The results obtained from an initial sample of 104
reverse LBO firms show that the performance (measured by ROI)
of the reverse LBO firms is greater, on average, than the
performance of control firms matched by industry and size.
The lack of statistical significance of the test statistic,
however, precludes support of the hidden value hypothesis as
the motivation for buyouts.

Perhaps the most noteworthy

result of the chapter is that there is a statistically
significant increase in the value of the firm (measured as the
difference between the firm's value at the second IPO and the
firm's value at the time of the buyout).

A value higher at

the going-public date than at the buyout certainly offers an
opportunity for managers to reap the gain for themselves
rather than sharing it with stockholders.

The test of Hs,

however, contradicts this view. On a time-adjusted basis, the
mean difference between the ROI of management and of buyout
shareholders, although positive, is not different than zero.
Contrary to the prediction of H4, in their publicprivate-public cycle, re-LBOs do not necessarily outperform
the remaining reverse LBO firms that stay as public entities
after they return to public.

This finding may suggest that

LBOs can also be repeated if managers think that the first
cycle did not bring the firm to the desired value.

Although

the lack of a strong conclusion about the undervaluation
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explanation for re-LBOs

(and LBOs in general)

is disap

pointing, future research should further investigate other
potential explanations for this observed phenomenon.
5.6 Notes to Chapter 5
1.

See Chapter 3, pp. 39-40, for the procedure followed in
constructing the initial sample.

2.

This result, of course, might also be due to a technical
effect.
In certain industries there may be a higher
tendency for buyouts of small firms in order to attain an
optimal (economic-plant) size.
Accordingly, a higher
frequency and higher value-gain buyouts in an industry
may not necessarily be related to the undervaluation
hypothesis.

3.

Ideally, this hypothesis must be tested with reLBOdata.
However, because the majority of the firms in the reLBO
sample experienced their first buyout as divisions, we
lack the data necessary to conduct the test.
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Chapter 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study examines the phenomenon of re-LBOs; that is, the
practice

of

going

reobtaining public

private
status

via

management

through

a new

buyout,
initial

offering, and then going private a second time.

then
public

Using a

sample of 21 re-LBO firms, the study challenges the free cash
flow argument of LBOs by replicating the Lehn and Poulsen
(1989) study.

If Jensen's free cash flow argument is an

explanation for going-private transactions in general, it must
be a major driving force behind re-LBOs as well.

That is,

regardless of a firm's past experience with LBOs, the free
cash flow argument must also hold for the second LBOs.

The

findings in Chapter 3, however, tell a different story.

They

indicate that, although the free cash flow variable is unable
to explain both the likelihood of going private and the
premiums

paid

in

buyout

transactions,

the

tax

savings

potential of a firm does play an important role in the goingprivate decision.

The findings also indicate that, contrary

to the predictions of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis,
growth in sales is positively and significantly related to the
premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders in such transactions.
Chapter 4 proposes the information asymmetry hypothesis
as an explanation for LBOs in general,

and surveys the

opinions of management teams involved in such transactions.
The analyses that were applied to 131 completed questionnaires
130
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suggest several conclusions.

The results show that managers

do not consider the participation of a buyout specialist as a
major determinant of a buyout's success.

This finding is in

contrast to previous empirical evidence that suggests that
buyout specialists are among one of the driving forces behind
the improved efficiency following the buyouts.

Chapter 4 also

reveals that the majority of financial executives think that
the target firm as a whole is less valuable than the sum of
its parts and that its stock is undervalued in the pre-buyout
period.

Although

these

opinions

of

executives

show

discrepancies among groups formed by principal components and
cluster analysis, the differences stem from the strength of
their opinions rather than from a divergence of opinions among
the groups.

These conclusions must be evaluated, of course,

within the limiting aspects of survey research.
The findings presented in Chapter 4 suggest that the
information advantage of insiders may play a role in LBOs.
Chapter 5 investigates the issue further, using a sample of
104

reverse

LBO

firms

in tests

asymmetry-based hypotheses.

of several

information

Using an initial sample of 104

reverse LBO firms, the performance (measured by ROI) of the
reverse LBO firms is not statistically greater than the
performance of control firms matched by industry and size.
This finding fails to support the undervaluation hypothesis in
general.

There is, however, a statistically significant

increase in the value of the firm (measured as the difference
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between the firm's value at the second IPO and the firm's
value at the time of the buyout) .

A value higher at the

going-public date than at the buyout certainly offers an
opportunity for managers to reap the gain themselves rather
than to share it with stockholders.

The finding from the test

of Hg, however, contradicts this view.

On a time-adjusted

basis, the mean difference between the ROI of management and
of buyout shareholders, although positive, is not different
from zero.

Overall, the findings of Chapter 5 are mixed, and

generally deviate from the information asymmetry hypothesis.
This should not prevent researchers from investigating the
characteristics of reverse and re-LBO firms as new data become
available.

These firms provide certain cases that need to be

explored.

One such incident is the dividend initiation of

reverse LBOs despite the fact that they are in need of cash,
at least to cover the service costs of their extensive debt.
In

sum,

this

dissertation

is

only

a

start

for

the

investigation of reverse and re-LBO transactions, not an end.
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APPENDIX
Managements' Perception of Buyouts
Instructions: Please mark an X on the line provided beside
each question. Given the following scale, the length of the
line segment will be taken as the value corresponding to
your opinion on each of the statements below.
0. Strongly disagree

4. Strongly agree

Example: The X marked on the line below indicates that the
respondent "almost" strongly agrees with the statement.
0

1
----------

1

2

3

1----------------

4

1
---------- 1------ X ---1

Begin :
1. A buyout allows management to focus on long- 0
1 2
3
4
term growth and profitability................ |----1-------1------ 1----- 1
2.

In management buyouts there is a conflict
of interest on the part of the management
in that it is acting on both sides of the
0
1 2
3
4
transaction as buyer and seller of a company. |----1-------1------ 1----- 1

3.

It is easier for a private firm to sell
assets or divisions than it is for a publicly 0
1 2
3
4
held company.............................. |------ 1------ 1------ 1----- 1

4.

It is necessary to rely on outside consul
tants and takeover specialists to determine
0
1 2
3
4
the gains of a buyout.....................|------ 1------ I------ 1----- 1

5.

In a hostile takeover, incumbent management
0
1 2
3
4
of the target firm is replaced............. |------ 1------ 1------ 1----- 1

6.

The main motivation for our buyout was our
opinion that pre-buyout market prices of our 0
1 2
3
4
stock did not reflect their "true" value. . . |------ 1----- 1------ 1------ 1

7.

The premium offered is affected by the
recent trend in reported earnings per share

8.

Outside shareholders exert pressure in a
publicly held company to increase or at least 0
1 2
3
4
maintain previous quarters' earningsfigures.
|----- 1------ J------ 1----- 1

9.

Firm performance improves after a buyout
because of a closer relation between
0
1 2
3
4
management action and rewards............. |------ 1------ J------ 1----- 1

0
1 2
3
4
. |----- 1------ 1------ 1----- 1
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10. A buyout is an appropriate strategy in a
firm for which the parts are worth more them 0
the whole............................... |--

1

2

3

J______ l_______L

11 .The premium in a buyout is larger, other

things being equal, when Incumbent management 0
1
2
3
4
also sells off some of its shares............|----1------- 1------1----- 1
12 .The main motivation in our buyout was that

the firm was subject to a hostile

0
1
2
takeover. . |----1------- 1

3
4
-1----- 1

13 .The equity investors in a buyout usually

go public again

0
1
2
3
4
in three to five years. . . . |-----1------ 1------ 1----- [

14 .The equity investors receive a return on

their investment commensurate with the risk
0
1
2
3
4
they t a k e -------------------------------- |------1------ 1------ 1----- 1
15.

Before the buyout my company was performing
better than comparable firms within the same 0
1
2
3
4
industry---------------------------------- |------1------ 1------ 1----- 1

16.

Premiums paid to shareholders in a buyout
are not necessarily indicative of the
difference between the market value of the
stock and management's belief about the
0
1
2
3
4
"true" value of the stock................... |---- 1------ 1------1----- |

17 .There is an element of disloyalty in a

management-led buyout since it amounts to
admitting that management will do a better
job for themselves than they did for share0
1
2
3
4
holders................................... I---- 1------ 1------1----- 1

□

Please m a r k the b o x to t h e left with an

X

i f you are i n t e rested

in r e c eiving the results o f this survey.

This concludes the questionnaire. All responses are confidential.
Please place the completed form in the postage-paid envelope we
have provided.

Thank you for your participation.
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